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ABIGAIL ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ACCESS

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, nineteen-year-old Abigail Burroughs was diagnosed with head and
neck cancer.' Abigail underwent the conventional treatments-chemotherapy and
radiation therapy-with no success. 2 Her physician recommended that Abigail
attempt to enroll in clinical trials for two unapproved drugs that her physician
hoped might have an effect on her tumor.3 Abigail, however, was unable to enroll
in the trials because she did not meet the scientific criteria for inclusion.4 In June
2001, shortly after enrolling in a clinical trial of a third unapproved drug, Abigail
passed away.5 Following her death, her father founded the Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail Alliance) to advocate for
increased access to unapproved drugs for terminally ill patients.6
In January 2003, the Abigail Alliance submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) a proposal for new regulations to increase access to
unapproved therapy. They proposed creating a tiered approval system that would
allow terminally ill patients to purchase unapproved drugs that had completed
Phase 17 clinical trials. 8 In April 2003, the FDA rejected this proposal because it

1. See Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of UnapprovedDrugs: The Case of
Abigail Alliance v Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 205 (2007); Sue Kovach, The Abigail
Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle an Uncanny Bureaucracy, LIFE
EXTENSION
MAG.,
Sept.
2007,
http://www.lefiorg/magazine/mag2007/sep2007-reportabigail_01.htm.
2. See Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205.
3. See id.; Kovach, supra note 1.
4. See Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205. The cetuximab trial only enrolled patients
with colon cancer, while the gefitinib trial was restricted to patients with lung cancer. See id.;
Rabiya S. Tuma, Expanded-Access Programs: Little-Heard Views from Industry, ONCOLOGY
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at 19. The Abigail Alliance website also states that the drug companies that
sponsored the trials "couldn't provide [Abigail] with [the drug] for compassionate use." See
Kovach, supra note 1. Other sources suggest that the companies refused to seek FDA approval to
supply Abigail the drug outside of clinical trials. See, e.g., Beryl Lieff Benderly, Experimental
Drugs on Trial, ScI. AM., Oct. 2007, at 92, 96. The programs that provide patients access to
unapproved drugs outside of clinical trials are discussed in more detail in Part III, infra.
5. See Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205.
6. See id; see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, http://abigailalliance.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Abigail Alliance Website].
7. Clinical trials are split up into four phases, each designed to answer a different research
question. Phase I trials "test a new drug or treatment in a small group of people for the first time to
evaluate its safety, determine a safe dosage range, and identify side effects." See ClinicalTrials.gov,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2009). In Phase 2, trials involve larger numbers of subjects and collect further safety data, but this
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"would upset the appropriate balance that [the FDA is] seeking to maintain, by
giving almost total weight to the goal of early availability and giving little
recognition to the importance of marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge for
patients and physicians of their likely clinical benefit and their toxicity." 9 The
Abigail Alliance then filed a formal citizen petition with the FDA (a required
step before one can file a lawsuit against the agency), again calling for a tiered
approval system. 10 Before the FDA responded to the citizen petition, Abigail
Alliance filed suit, alleging that FDA regulations that restrict terminally ill
patients' access to unapproved drugs violate a fundamental constitutional right
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11
A D.C. district court judge dismissed Abigail Alliance's case, finding that a
constitutional right to access unapproved drugs did not exist and that the
government's policy restricting access to unapproved drugs survived rational
basis review.12 The Alliance appealed to the D.C. Circuit.' 3 In a decision that
surprised many commentators, 14 Judges Rogers and Ginsburg reversed the

phase also examines the efficacy of the investigational product. Phase 3 trials involve large groups
of subjects in order to establish the efficacy and monitor side effects. Phase 4 trials are sometimes
conducted after a drug goes onto the market to determine if the drug has side effects in particular
subgroups and whether it has long-term complications. Id.
8. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *3-*4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004); see also Citizen Petition of the
Abigail Alliance & Wash. Legal Found. to the Food & Drug Admin., In re Tier 1 Initial Approval
Program To Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs (June 11, 2003), available at
http://www.abigail-alliance.org/WLF -FDA.pdf. In addition to petitioning the FDA, the Abigail
Alliance also lobbied Congress to advocate for their proposed legislation.
9. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). One of the more significant
concerns that the Abigail Alliance raised is that in many clinical trials, research subjects are
randomized to receive either the unapproved therapy or placebo. Many trials therefore offer
patients only a fifty-fifty chance at getting the unapproved therapy. The Abigail Alliance was
seeking to expand access outside of clinical trials for individuals who were not eligible or who did
not want to risk receiving placebo instead of the unapproved therapy.
10. See AbigailAlliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *4.
11. See id.at *4-*5, *25-*26. The FDA officially responded to the citizen petition in
December 2003, after Abigail Alliance filed suit against the agency. See U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Chronological List of Petitions and Advisory Opinions: From January 1, 2003
through December 30, 2003, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/CITPETS/03citpetlist.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2009).
12. See AbigailAlliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *2.
13. See AbigailAlliance, 495 F.3d at 700-01.
14. See, e.g., Susan Okie, Access Before Approval - A Right To Take Experimental Drugs?,
355 NEW ENG. J.MED. 437, 437 (2006) (discussing the "surprising court decision").
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district court's decision and held that terminally ill patients did, in fact, have a
constitutional right to access unapproved drugs.' 5 The FDA then filed a petition
for rehearing en banc. That petition was granted, and the en banc court vacated
the panel's decision. 16 Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied Abigail
Alliance's petition for certiorari. 17 The D.C. Circuit is widely recognized as
having special expertise on matters of administrative law, and the Abigail
Alliance opinion is now considered an authoritative judgment on the topic of a
constitutional right to access experimental therapies.' 8
The Abigail Alliance case demonstrates the highly sympathetic nature of
claims for access to unapproved therapy outside of clinical trials when such
access is the last hope of a terminally ill patient. In the wake of this case, legal
claims for access have been made through contractual or quasi-contractual
mechanisms.' 9 These cases raise many complex policy questions, some of which
may be difficult or inappropriate for courts to take into account.20 In this Article,
we argue that a constitutional right to access unapproved therapy should not be
recognized by the courts. Further, claims for expanded access are too uncertain
and costly to merit substantial regulatory changes. Rather than expanding access
to unapproved therapy outside of clinical trials, we contend that more efforts
should be made to expand access to the clinical trials themselves.
In Part I, we analyze the reasoning behind the Abigail Alliance decision,
examine why the en banc D.C. Circuit did not grant a right of access to
unapproved therapy, and consider objections that have been raised in favor of a
right to medical self-defense. In Part II, we first consider the contractual and
quasi-contractual litigation in this area and then demonstrate that courts lack the

15. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d

470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Judge Griffith dissented. See id at 486.
16. AbigailAlliance, 495 F.3d at 701.

17. AbigailAlliance,495 F.3d at 695, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
18. The only subsequent opinion to cite Abigail Alliance on the question of a constitutional
right to access unapproved treatment followed the majority's reasoning. See CareToLive v. von
Eschenbach, 525 F. Supp. 2d 952 (S.D. Ohio 2007), aff'd, No. 07-4465, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
18780 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008). In CareToLive v. von Eschenbach,a judge in the Southern District
of Ohio relied on Abigail Alliance to reject prostate cancer patients' constitutional claim for access
to Provenge, an unapproved "biological product intended to treat a particular type of metastatic
prostate cancer." See CareToLive, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 965-66.
19. See, e.g., Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 128, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing a claim for access based on a theory of promissory estoppel).
20. Cf 0. Carter Snead, Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of Analogy: A Critique of the
Right to Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 12 (2007) (arguing that the existence of a
right to medical self-defense "must be resolved in the public square through the democratic
process").
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requisite institutional competence necessary to adjudicate these claims. We
explain and evaluate existing FDA regulations in this area in Part III. In Part IV,
we argue that, as a matter of policy, claims for access to unapproved therapy
outside of clinical trials should rarely be granted. We conclude in Part V that the
current approach to providing access to unapproved therapy outside of clinical
trials runs the risk of creating a costly policy of exceptions. Instead, we propose
reforming clinical trial requirements to involve more participants, including more
terminally ill patients, in clinical trials, while providing access outside of clinical
trials only in limited circumstances.
I. THE ABIGAIL ALLIANCE CASE: SHOULD WE GRANT ACCESS TO UNAPPROVED
THERAPY OUTSIDE OF CLINICAL TRIALS?

In the Abigail Alliance case, the en banc D.C. Circuit faced the following
question:
Whether the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause embraces the right of
a terminally ill patient with no remaining approved treatment options to decide,
in consultation with his or her own doctor, whether to seek access to
investigational medications that the [FDA] concedes are safe and promising
enough for substantial human testing. 2'
An eight-judge majority ruled that the constitutional right to liberty does not
extend to a right to access unapproved drugs.22 In reaching this conclusion, the
majority relied on the two-part analysis for substantive due process cases that the
Supreme Court articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg.23 According to that
analysis, a court first must consider whether the plaintiffs have provided "a
careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. '24 The majority
assumed, for the sake of argument, that Abigail Alliance had satisfied this first
requirement. 25
The dissent, written by Judge Rogers and joined by then-Chief Judge
Ginsburg, disagreed with the majority's description of the liberty interest at

21. Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
22. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697, 701-02. Judge Griffith wrote the majority opinion

for the en banc court. See id. at 697. Judges Ginsburg and Rogers, who formed the majority for the
panel court's decision, dissented from the en banc court's decision. See id at 714 (Rogers, J.,

dissenting).
23. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
24. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 701-02 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
25. See id.
at 702.
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stake.26 While the majority defined the interest asserted by Abigail Alliance as a
right to take on "enormous risks" to obtain "potentially life-saving drugs, '27 the
dissent defined the asserted interest as a "specific right to act to save one's own
life.", 28 The dissent faulted the majority's description as overly broad and
inappropriately focused on personal autonomy, a concept that the Supreme Court
has held cannot be the sole basis for a protected liberty interest. 29 The dissent
argued that Abigail Alliance asserted a specific right grounded in selfpreservation, not an abstract interest based in personal autonomy. 30 In order to
make this argument, however, the dissent departed from how the Abigail
Alliance itself had described the right at stake. Moreover, the majority rightly
noted that redescribing the liberty interest as a broad right to save one's life was
not the kind of careful description required by Glucksberg.3'
The second step under the Glucksberg analysis required the court to consider
whether a liberty interest in access to unapproved drugs was "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed., 32 Abigail
Alliance argued that a protected liberty interest in access was deeply rooted in
our nation's history for two reasons: 1) there is a long history of the government
not interfering with access to drugs; and 2) based on existing common law
doctrines, prohibiting access to unapproved drugs was "inconsistent with the way
that our legal tradition treats persons in all other life-threatening situations. 33
Although the court ultimately ruled against Abigail Alliance, it focused a great
deal of analysis on these issues. Examining the court's analysis illuminates the
complex policy issues involved in providing access to experimental therapy.
A. The History and Tradition of Drug Regulation
Abigail Alliance argued that a protected liberty interest in access was deeply
rooted in our nation's history because of a lack of governmental interference with
access to drugs for much of our nation's history. Government regulations did not
address the efficacy of drugs before the 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug,

26. See id at 714, 716 (Rogers, J. dissenting) ("[T]he description of the right is of crucial
importance-too broad and a right becomes all-encompassing and impossible to evaluate; too
narrow and a right appears trivial.").
27.Id. at 710.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 716 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725).
30. See id
31. Id. at 701 n.5.
32. Id. at 701-02 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21) (internal quotations omitted).
33. See id. at 703, 707.
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and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).34 The majority opinion noted, however, that access to
unapproved drugs of unproven safety has long been restricted.35 States and
colonies began regulating drugs for safety as early as 1736, when Virginia passed
a law that regulated the sale of drugs in an attempt to prevent deceptive sales
practices by pharmacies.3 6 Federal drug safety regulation began in 1848, when
the government banned the importation of adulterated drugs.3 7
The court further concluded that whether a historical right to access
unapproved drugs existed did not depend on the fact that the first major efficacy
regulation occurred in 1962. Focusing on the discretion granted to Congress and
administrative agencies to regulate in light of new information, the court
determined that "a lack of government interference throughout history might be
some evidence that a right is deeply rooted. But standing alone, it cannot be
enough." 38 In sum, the court found evidence that the states and the federal
government historically have regulated access to unapproved drugs, but it also
concluded that a history of such regulation was not necessary to reject the
argument that a constitutional right to access exists.
B. Common Law DoctrinesSupporting a Right ofAccess
After determining that the absence of efficacy regulation for much of our
nation's history was not enough to support a fundamental right of access, the
court considered whether the common law doctrines of necessity, intentional
interference, and self-defense supported a fundamental right of self-preservation.
Much of this discussion focused on whether an unapproved drug of uncertain
safety and efficacy could be considered necessary for prolonging the life of a
terminally ill patient.
1. The Doctrineof Necessity
Necessity, or choice of evils, provides an individual with a defense when
"physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of

34. See id. at 703, 706.
35. Id. at 703.
36. See id. at 703-04. Specifically, the law sought to prevent "dangerous and intolerable" drug
selling practices by prohibiting surgeons and apothecaries from selling patients greater quantities of
drugs than the patients needed and from concealing the composition and treatment value of drugs.
EDWARD KREMERS, GLENN SONNEDECKER
OF PHARMACY

& GEORGE

158 (1986).

37. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.
38. Id. at 706.

URDANG, KREMERS AND URDANG'S HISTORY
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two evils. ' 39 Relying on United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative,40 the majority dismissed the necessity argument because Congress
had previously expressly eliminated a necessity defense in the context of access
to unapproved drugs. 41 Through the FDCA, Congress explicitly restricted
patients' access to only those drugs that were approved as safe and effective,
thereby eliminating a necessity defense for terminally ill patients.4 2 Because
Congress had clearly eliminated the necessity defense by passing the FDCA, the
court did not reach the question of whether the necessity doctrine could ever
provide support for a constitutional right.4 3 In rejecting the necessity defense, the
majority also relied on the fact that there is significant uncertainty regarding
44
whether unapproved drugs can save patients' lives.
By contrast, the dissent argued that the necessity defense is evidence of a
tradition of protection for the right to self-preservation. The dissent drew an
analogy to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. In Cruzan, the
Supreme Court acknowledged a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment
grounded in the tort of battery.45 Recognition of this right did not
constitutionalize the tort of battery, nor did it take away Congressional power to
override the common law protection of battery.46 It simply took the existence of
battery law protections as evidence of an underlying constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment, just as, according to the dissent, the necessity defense is
evidence of an underlying constitutional right to self-preservation.4 7
Although the majority relied on Congress's elimination of the necessity
defense and did not explicitly address these arguments by the dissent, there is
reason to doubt that necessity could ground a constitutional right to medical selfdefense. Professor Carter Snead has convincingly argued that necessity cannot

39. Id. at 707 (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483,
490 (2001).
40. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
41. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707-08 ("Under any conception of legal necessity, one

principle is clear: The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a determination
of values .... Congress may limit or even eliminate a necessity defense that might otherwise be
available. That is precisely what the FDCA has done.").
42. See id.
43. See id
44. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 709 n. 15 ("[T]he safety and efficacy records of experimental
drugs are not fully known. We thus cannot know until after the clinical testing process has been
completed that these drugs are in fact necessary.").
45. Id. at 718 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990)).
46. See id. at 718.
47. See id.
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support the right to access unapproved drugs because of the uncertainty inherent
in using such drugs. 48 One of the legal elements of the necessity defense is that
"the individual must believe in good faith that the unlawful act will remedy the
greater evil.",49 Given the uncertainty surrounding the safety and efficacy of drugs
in clinical trials, Snead argued that terminally ill patients cannot assert in good
faith that such drugs are necessary to save their lives.5 ° Without some degree of
confidence that the means used will save the patient's life, there cannot be a
viable claim to exercise the right.
In the majority's and dissent's disagreement about the necessity defense,
there are two factors at play. The first is the amount of certainty needed to trust
that a particular means of self-defense will be useful, and the second factor is the
desperation that may drive one to use a means of self-defense even if it is
unlikely to be effective. A terminally ill patient who has no other treatment
options could "believe in good faith" that an unapproved drug is the only thing
that could possibly save her life and is therefore necessary for prolonging her life,
despite evidence that the drug is unlikely to be effective. 5' Other contexts in
which the necessity defense is used do not help resolve which of these factors
should receive greater weight. It is not clear how to take into account
uncertainties regarding whether an actor's conduct will successfully protect
him. 52 There is likely to be some degree of uncertainty about any extreme
48. See Snead, supra note 20, at 10.

49. Id.
50. Id. ("It seems more accurate to say ... terminally ill patients strongly hope (with some
evidence derived from animal models) that the experimental unapproved therapy will yield some
benefit.").
51. Cf Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 715 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("The court commits a logical
error of dramatic consequence by concluding that the investigational drugs are somehow not
'necessary.' While the potential cures may not prove sufficient to save the life of a terminally ill
patient, they are surely necessary if there is to be any possibility of preserving her life.") (internal
citation omitted); Geetaa Anand, Saying No to Penelope, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, at Al (quoting
the father of a terminally ill four-year-old girl as saying: "Ifanything has a prayer of saving her,
how can you argue it's not the right thing to do?").
52. The legal literature does not discuss this question in depth, although cursory references to
the interaction between the necessity doctrine and uncertainty can be found. See, e.g., Steven M.
Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicabilityfor the Necessity Defense
to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 n.40 (1987) (discussing the fact that
"[c]ausation is seldom an issue because necessity cases only reach trial after the defendant has
performed an act averting some harm, so the court can look at the act retrospectively"); Shaun P.
Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1527, 1586 (2005) (observing that when
assessing the efficacy of lawful and nonlawful alternatives, "[b]ecause there is inherent uncertainty
regarding the consequences of any future act, any assessment of efficacy is both nonbinary and
probabilistic").

ABIGAIL ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ACCESS

measure taken to protect one's life; an abortion may not succeed in saving the life
of the mother and a handgun aimed at an intruder may not fire. It may be that the
law only allows for the necessity defense when the likelihood that the measure
will succeed is above some threshold of certainty, and medical procedures like
abortions or weapons like handguns are assumed to function above this threshold
of certainty. Alternatively, unapproved drugs may fall into a category of their
own, because complicated scientific judgments are a prerequisite to establishing
their safety and efficacy.
Resolving when drugs should be made available requires complex analysis
of many factors, including the existing data about safety and efficacy, the
severity of the diseases they would be used to treat, and the available alternatives.
The policy solution to this problem has been to allow the FDA to regulate the
testing and approval of drugs and to determine what evidence is needed before a
particular drug can be made available for use. Therefore, the existence of a
necessity defense does not directly pertain to the question of access to
experimental therapy and cannot support a right of access to therapy before it has
been approved.
2. The Tort of IntentionalInterference
Abigail Alliance also argued that the tort of intentional interference provides
support for a right to access unapproved drugs. This tort consists of a tortfeasor
preventing an individual from providing aid that is necessary to another's bodily
security.53 However, the majority concluded that withholding unapproved drugs
is not intentional interference because drugs that have not been proven safe and
effective cannot be considered necessary to bodily security.5 4 Thus, FDA
regulations that restrict access to unapproved drugs do not prevent patients from
receiving necessary aid, and intentional interference does not help establish a
constitutional right to access. 55
The dissent countered that the tort of intentional interference does provide
grounding for the self-preservation interest in accessing unapproved drugs. In
some cases, investigational treatments are the only means terminally ill patients
have for prolonging their lives. 56 The majority "confuse[d] what is necessary

with what is sufficient" when it concluded that unapproved drugs cannot be
considered "reasonably necessary" because they have not been proven safe and

53. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708 (citing
54. See id. at 708-09.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 719 (Rogers, J., dissenting).

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §

326).
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57

Again, the crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent is
how to evaluate the uncertain effects of untested drugs on terminally ill patients.
At the time the patients want the drugs, neither doctors nor lawyers nor
policymakers can know what effects, if any, those drugs may have. The dissent
disregards this inherent uncertainty because of the lack of other options for
saving the patient's life. The majority, on the other hand, relies on this uncertainty
to dismiss the claim that unapproved drugs could ever be necessary, without
acknowledging the lack of alternative treatments for patients. Balancing the
many considerations involved is difficult when the choice before the court is
binary-the court can either recognize a constitutional right of access or not.
Agencies like the FDA may be able to make more nuanced judgments about
access policy in general, and about particular drugs, based upon the available
data. The FDA can create limited programs of access for individuals in great
need when there are data to support that the drug will be safe and effective
enough, weigh the risks and benefits to determine which particular conditions or
patients should be eligible for these programs, or choose not to allow access in
particular cases.
C. Right to Self-Defense
Another argument asserted in favor of a constitutional right to access
unapproved drugs was that both self-defense and abortion jurisprudence ground
the right to self-preservation or medical self-defense.5 8
1. TraditionalSelf-Defense as a Basisfor the Right
Self-defense and a right to self-preservation are clearly related concepts. A
claim of self-defense can be made "when a victim is being attacked by an
aggressor and uses reasonable force to overcome immediate danger., 59 Abigail
Alliance argued that the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence has
60
demonstrated that traditional self-defense applies to the medical context.
According to Abigail Alliance, the analogy between medical self-defense and
traditional self-defense is not disturbed by the fact that drugs pose risks of side

57. Id.
58. See id at 717-22.
59. Id.at 709 (majority opinion).
60. See id.They argued that in addition to recognizing the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade
"recognized another, entirely separate right to abortion: a woman's right to abort a fetus at any
stage of a pregnancy if doing so is necessary to preserve her life or health." Id.
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effects because an act of traditional self-defense may also pose risks. 6' For
example, a victim's attempt to defend herself may anger her attacker, leading her
attacker to harm her more egregiously than he otherwise would have. 62 Under
this reasoning, terminally ill patients should be permitted to access unapproved
drugs even if those drugs pose serious risks.
The majority found the self-defense analogy inapt,63 concluding that
"terminally ill patients cannot fairly be characterized as using reasonable force to
64
defend themselves when they take unproven and possibly unsafe drugs.
Abigail Alliance sought the right to assume "enormous risks in pursuit of
potentially life-saving drugs," not the right to defend one's own life through the
use of reasonable force.65 Furthermore, the majority distinguished the interest in
access to unapproved drugs from a woman's right to protect her health by
terminating a pregnancy because terminating a pregnancy has known or
estimable therapeutic value, while unapproved drugs do not.66 Again, the court
relied on the uncertain safety and efficacy of unapproved drugs to reject medical
self-defense as a basis for a constitutional right.67
In opposition to the majority's reasoning, constitutional law scholar Eugene
Volokh has argued forcefully for the right to medical self-defense. Volokh's first
justification for a constitutional right to medical self-defense, its similarity to
lethal self-defense, is based on the premise that a constitutional right to lethal
self-defense exists. 68 Volokh argues that there are two important limitations on
medical self-defense, both of which also apply to lethal self-defense. 69 These
similarities between the limitations on lethal self-defense and medical selfdefense appear to be the only basis Volokh provides to demonstrate that the two

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
at 709-10.
64. Id.at 710.
65. Id.at 709-10.
66. See id at 710.
67. See id.
68. For a full description of Volokh's arguments in favor of finding a constitutional right to
lethal self-defense, see Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental
Treatments, and Paymentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1813 (2007). Volokh's claim that lethal
self-defense has constitutional roots has not been directly challenged by those who have responded
to his assertion of a right to medical self-defense; however, there may be some debate about the
constitutional roots of the lethal self-defense doctrine. See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, SelfDefense and State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 473 (2008) ("First, it seems unimaginable that there
is not a constitutional right to act in self-defense. Second, there does not seem to be any clear
answer as to where one might find it.").
69. Volokh, supra note 68, at 1821.
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rights are analogous.7 °
First, he argues that both rights are limited to situations in which the defense
is both necessary to prevent death or "radically debilitating" harm and exercised
against the source of the threatened harm. 7' For example, a victim may not injure
a person who is not her attacker, and a terminally ill patient may not steal a drug
from a drug company.72 A terminally ill patient may, however, attack her disease
with a "voluntarily provided" drug.7 3
The second limitation that Volokh elaborates is that both rights only exist in
the face of an imminent threat. 74 A victim has a right to use lethal self-defense
against an attacker only when a lethal response is necessary and the victim has no
alternatives. 75 According to Volokh, a terminally ill patient similarly may use
medical self-defense only when she is diagnosed with a "medical threat" and
there is no "permitted satisfactory therapy. ' ' 76 Volokh does not define what would
constitute permitted satisfactory treatments, so it is difficult to determine when a
patient could make a valid claim for access to unapproved therapy on his view.
Volokh's relatively thin analogy between medical self-defense and
traditional self-defense does not withstand critical examination. 77 Lethal selfdefense "is conceived as a justification for the use of force to repel the
application of force by another." 78 Terminally ill patients seeking access to
unapproved drugs cannot be understood to be using force against others.79
Perhaps one could argue that terminally ill patients use force against their
diseases when they seek medical treatment, and in that way they are like victims
of crime who fight their attackers with lethal self-defense. 80 However, equating

70. See id. at 1821.
71. See Volokh, supra note 68, at 1821-22. In Volokh's view, radically debilitating or serious
threats include the threat of dementia or paralysis but not the common cold or minor bruises.
72. See id
73. Id. at 1822.
74. See id. at 1823-24.
75. See id at 1823.
76. Id.at 1824.
77. See Richard M. Cooper, Response, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 31, 32 (2007) ("In arguing by
analogy for a 'right of medical self-defense,' Professor Volokh disregards the ways in which the
proposed analogy does not hold."); Snead, supra note 20, at 6 ("Granting for the sake of argument
that there is a fundamental unenumerated right to lethal self-defense, it seems that this is materially
different from the kind of entitlement Professor Volokh argues for in the medical domain.").
78. Snead, supra note 20, at 7.
79. See id; see also Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
("[T]erminally ill patients cannot fairly be characterized as using reasonable force to defend
themselves when they take unproven and possibly unsafe drugs.").
80. See Snead, supra note 20, at 7.
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disease to human attackers is problematic. 81 Disease and death are fundamentally
a part of human existence.82 Life-threatening human attacks are relatively rare.83
If self-defense is expanded to encompass disease threats, we will be left "in a
state of perpetual emergency; permanently in the sphere of exceptions rather than
rules. Taken to an extreme, this attitude might be corrosive of ethical safeguards
crucial to the respect for persons in the realm of biomedical research. 84 For
example, if terminal illness is viewed as an emergency equivalent to a lethal
attack perpetrated by another person, important protections, like informed
consent, may be disregarded in favor of doing anything and everything possible
to save a patient, regardless of the risks and that patient's preferences.85 Such an
approach could also justify overriding individual patient rights in favor of
important research that can address diseases that pose large risks for many others
in society. For these reasons, Volokh's analogy is unpersuasive.
2. Medical Self-Defense and Abortion
Volokh also argues that the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence
supports the right to medical self-defense by affirming a woman's right to abort a
postviability fetus to protect her own health. 86 The political controversy around
abortion generally, and postviability abortion specifically, suggests that abortion
jurisprudence may not be a promising basis for a right to medical self-defense.87
Furthermore, within abortion jurisprudence itself, legislative deference is
89
recommended in instances of scientific uncertainty. 8 Gonzales v. Carhart,

81. See id. at 8-9.
82. See id.at 8.
83. See Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP.,
Apr. 17, 2009, at 1, 5 tbl.B, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57-14.pdf
(finding that assault was the fifteenth leading cause of death in the United States in 2006,
accounting for only 0.8% of deaths).
84. Snead, supra note 20, at 8. Scholars have also offered other, less persuasive arguments that
dispute the analogy between lethal and medical self-defense. For example, the law prescribes the
relationships between persons, but not between persons and bacteria, viruses, genes, or other agents
of disease. See Cooper, supra note 77, at 32-33. Also, a victim carries out lethal self-defense with
whatever means are handy, while a terminally ill patient must engage in a transaction in interstate
commerce to carry out medical self-defense. See id. at 33-34. These arguments may take an overly
literal approach to the concept of self-defense.
85. See Snead, supra note 20, at 9.
86. See Volokh, supra note 68, at 1824 ("The Supreme Court has already recognized medical
self-defense in one context: abortion needed to protect the woman's life or health.").
87. See Snead, supra note 20, at 3.
88. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007).
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decided a month before Volokh published his article but likely after Volokh
wrote the piece, suggests that courts should defer to "legislative judgment about
the medical necessity of certain interventions" when there is ambiguity regarding
the safety and efficacy of the intervention." Issues about legislative deference are
discussed later,91 but it is important to note that a right to medical self-defense
would require deference to an individual's judgment (and not the legislature's
judgment) about medical necessity in the face of scientific uncertainty. If courts
were to take this approach, they would come into conflict with the Carhart
holding. 92
D. JudicialReluctance to Recognize New FundamentalRights
Because the majority opinion in Abigail Alliance found no constitutional
right to access unapproved drugs, the court determined that the FDA's policy
restricting access to unapproved drugs was subject to rational basis review. 93 The
court then concluded that the FDA's policy was rationally related to the
legitimate government purpose of protecting patients from "unreasonable risks
from investigational drugs that
may be neither safe nor effective" and affirmed
94
the district court's decision.
There are additional reasons that the court might have reached this verdict
that were not explicitly addressed in the case. One other such reason is that
extending substantive due process protection to previously unrecognized
fundamental rights is an extraordinary exercise of power. The Supreme Court has

89. 550 U.S. 124.
90. Snead, supra note 20, at 4; see also Cooper, supra note 77, at 37 ("In [Gonzales v.
Carhart], the Supreme Court observed that it 'has given state and federal legislatures wide
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty."') (quoting
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007)).
91. See Section I.B, infra.
92. Carhart,550 U.S. 124.
93. Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 728 (1997) (holding that if the interest at issue is not
a protected liberty interest, the government may burden that interest as long as the infringing policy
is "rationally related to legitimate government interests").
94. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 712-14. By contrast, the dissent considered whether the
liberty interest to save one's life was deeply rooted in our traditions and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. The dissent concluded that this interest was entrenched in our nation's history,
dating back to Samuel Adams's 1772 reference to "the duty of self-preservation." Id. at 717
(Rogers, J., dissenting). Having determined that a protected liberty interest existed, the dissent
would have remanded the case to the district court to determine whether "there exist[ed] a
compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored, to overcome the Alliance's interest." Id. at
728.
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explained that:
[W]e "have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to an
asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside
the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," lest
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of the Members of this Court. 95
Moreover, as argued below, 96 this area is one in which "there is no defect in the
system of democratic deliberation and

. . .

reasonable people might decide the

underlying questions of value and fact either way. 97 Thus, courts may rightly be
more reluctant to intervene here.
Furthermore, the consequences of recognizing a right to medical self-defense
may be dangerous. A right to medical self-defense might create "an exemption
for a large class of transactions from a central provision of the drug regulatory
system that has been instrumental in creating the conditions in which medical
products, including drugs to treat life-threatening and otherwise serious medical
conditions, are developed., 98 Such an exemption might necessitate radical
changes to FDA policies and the Controlled Substances Act. 99 Courts might be
reluctant to recognize a right to medical defense that is destructive of trusted and
important regulatory programs. For these reasons, and for the reasons examined
above, it is easy to understand the decision reached in Abigail Alliance.
Recognizing a fundamental right to access unapproved drugs is a tenuous
proposition that is unlikely to be revisited by the courts.

95. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)) (citations omitted).
96. Section II.B, infra.
97. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1162 (1997).
98. Cooper, supra note 77, at 35.
99. See id A decision that was destructive of these regulatory schemes might be viewed as
analogous to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Cooper, supra note 77, at 39. Lochner
was an early twentieth century decision in which the Supreme Court invalidated a law that aimed to
protect the health of bakers by limiting the number of hours they could work, on the ground that it
violated a constitutional right to freely contract. See 198 U.S. at 53. Lochner ushered in an era in
which the Court overturned more laws and regulations than it historically had invalidated, and it
has been widely criticized as an example of judicial overreaching by defining constitutional rights
too broadly. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV.
821, 821 (2005).
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II. CONTRACTUAL AND QUASI-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO
EXPERIMENTAL THERAPY THROUGH LITIGATION

Abigail Alliance's attempt to establish a constitutional right of access to
experimental therapy may have been unsuccessful, but others have brought cases
with the aim of expanding access to experimental therapies under contractual and
quasi-contractual legal theories. However, these claims are unlikely to be
successful, in part because courts properly recognize that the judicial system is
not the appropriate forum for review of this issue.
A. Efforts to Obtain Access Through Litigation
Although there has been a great deal of discussion about litigation as an
effective tool to compel access to experimental therapy, 100 patients' hopes and
commentators' concerns seem largely unfounded. The majority of individual
claims seeking access to unapproved drugs have involved allegations that a
research sponsor had a contractual duty to provide access to the experimental
therapy.1 ' Whether the amount of litigation increases may turn on whether courts
determine that by providing informed consent documents to research participants,
research sponsors incur contractual obligations. If courts find contractual claims
can flow from consent documents, a variety of novel legal theories may be
applied against research sponsors, which could lead to a flurry of litigation. In
this section, we examine whether contractual claims for access are legally

100. John D. Winter, Is it Time to Abandon FDA 's No Release from Liability Regulation for
Clinical Studies?, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 526 (2008) ("At the same time that manufacturers are
being required to accept the additional risks associated with pediatric and geriatric patients in
clinical studies, there has been a growing number of theories of clinical trial liability and a trend of
patients advocating for early or continued access to investigational medicines when a sponsor did
not wish to proceed with a study, principally because of an uncertain risk/benefit ratio. To the
extent courts or FDA prospectively require greater access to investigational medicines because of
patient demand, sponsor liability risks are increased."). See generally Michelle M. Mello, David M.
Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 40, 40 (2003) (arguing that the rise in litigation will lead to a "more legalistic,
mechanistic approach to ethical review that does not further the interests of human subjects or
scientific progress").
101. See Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 128 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing
a claim for access based on a theory of promissory estoppel); Vinion v. Amgen Inc., 272 Fed.
Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008); Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Dahl v. HEM
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). In addition to these cases, there has been at least one claim alleging a right of
access based on unfair business practices. See Bernadette Tansey, The Dilemma of a Dying Man,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2003, at II.
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viable. 102
Courts have split on the question of whether informed consent documents
for clinical trials constitute contracts.10 3 One court has found that informed
consent documents are unilateral contracts.104 Other courts have distinguished
informed consent documents from contracts either because of the absence of
consideration and a meeting of the minds or because researchers have
discretionary power to end the study at any time.10 5 A subset of the courts that
have distinguished informed consent documents from contracts have found that
while the documents are not themselves contracts, elements of the consent
documents or consent processes may support contractual claims. 0 6 As a result of
these diverse decisions, the legal effect of informed consent documents remains
07
unclear.

102. We do not attempt to predict the very complicated issue of what consequences might
flow from increased litigation. It is possible that if courts are more inclined to recognize consent
forms as contracts, research sponsors will simply include disclaimers of any obligation to provide
access to experimental therapy. Courts may respond, however, by finding some clauses
unconscionable. Furthermore, consent forms are subject to review by institutional review boards
that may not permit sponsors to make such broad disclaimers. Therefore, it is hard to know what
the effects of increased litigation might be.
103. See Vinion v. Amgen Inc., 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008); Abney v. Amgen, Inc.,
443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993);
Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Courts have also split on the
question of whether informed consent documents for medical treatment constitute contracts. See,
e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 164 (2008).
104. Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1404-05.
105. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 547; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 482-84.
106. See Vinion, 272 Fed. Appx. 582; Abney, 443 F.3d at 547; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at
482-84.
107. Compare Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
941, 972 (2006) ("Notwithstanding the fact that most subjects sign written consent documents to
enroll in a study, courts have displayed reluctance to find binding contractual obligations in the
research setting."), and E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort
Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 33 (2003) (arguing that
there is no discernible trend suggesting that consent documents constitute contracts), with Michelle
M. Mello & Steven Joffe, Compact Versus Contract - Industry Sponsors' Obligations to Their
Research Subjects, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2737, 2738 (2007) ("Only a few courts have ruled on
whether a research consent form can constitute a legal contract that binds the investigators and
institution, but their answer has nearly always been yes.").
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1. DecisionsHolding that Informed Consent Documents Constitute
Contracts
Plaintiffs have succeeded in only one case regarding access to unapproved
therapy; there, the court provided access by holding that the informed consent
document constituted a contract. 10 8 In Dahl v. HEM PharmaceuticalsCorp., the
Ninth Circuit found that an informed consent document constituted a unilateral
contract.10 9 A unilateral contract exists when an offer does not invite a return
promise and the offer is accepted through performance, such as when a reward is
offered for a lost pet." 0 The petitioners in Dahl participated in a double-blind,
placebo-controlled clinical trial"' of Ampligen, an unapproved drug.' 12 They had
signed consent forms in which HEM Pharmaceuticals promised to offer them
Ampligen for twelve months through an open-label study" 13 at the conclusion of
the placebo-controlled trial, provided that Ampligen proved more effective than
the placebo. 114 At the conclusion of the trial, HEM refused to provide the
participants with Ampligen, and the petitioners sought a preliminary injunction
that would compel HEM to provide them Ampligen. 5
The court held that a binding unilateral contract was formed once the
participants completed the double-blind, placebo-controlled trial.116 In Dahl,

108. Dahl, 7 F.3d 1399. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., the Maryland Supreme
Court found that an informed consent document for research constituted a bilateral contract. 782
A.2d 807, 843, 858 (Md. 2001). However, Grimes is outside the scope of this Article because it did
not concern claims for access to unapproved therapy.
109. Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1404; see also Mello & Joffe, supra note 107, at 2740 (noting that Dahl
"supports the general proposition that a consent form can create a binding obligation on an industry
sponsor to provide the investigational medication after the trial is over"); Saver, supra note 107, at
973 n.135 (noting that the Dahl court held that the informed consent form and other study
documents constituted a unilateral contract).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (1981); see also Dahl, 7 F.3d at 140405 (explaining unilateral contracts).
111. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial, some participants receive the experimental
drug and some receive the placebo; neither the participants nor the researchers know who is
receiving the experimental drug or the placebo. See Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1401.
112. See id.
113. In an open-label study both the researchers and the participants know that the participants
are receiving the experimental drug and not a placebo or control drug. See id. at 1402.
114. See id at 1401-02.
115. See id. at 1401. FDA rejected HEM's application for a treatment Investigational New
Drug (IND) for Ampligen due to safety concerns about liver toxicity, severe abdominal pain, and
irregular heartbeat. But FDA did permit HEM to continue with clinical trials of Ampligen. See id.
at 1402.
116. See id at 1405.

ABIGAIL ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ACCESS

"[t]he deal was, 'if you submit to our experiment, we will give you a year's
supply of Ampligen at no charge."" 1 7 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a
unilateral contract was formed because the participants "performed by submitting
to the double-blind tests. They incurred the detriment of being tested upon for
HEM's studies in exchange for the promise of a year's treatment of
Ampligen."' 8 While this holding was a success for the terminally ill plaintiffs,
the situation in Dahl is unlikely to recur. Pharmaceutical companies and sponsors
have likely learned from this case that explicit promises to provide future access
should not be made in consent forms.
2. Decisions that DistinguishInformed Consent Documentsfrom Contracts
In two very similar cases brought by research participants against Amgen,
courts concluded that consent documents may provide evidence for some
contractual obligations but did not hold that the consent documents themselves
constituted contracts." 9 Both Abney v. Amgen and Suthers v. Amgen involved
Parkinson's patients who had participated in Phase 2 clinical trials of a synthetic
protein delivered to the brain.120 In Abney, the protocol and the informed consent
document stated that participants could elect to continue the protein treatment for
twenty-four months following the end of the trial, but they also stated that
Amgen could choose to discontinue the trial for various reasons, including safety
concerns.' 2' In Suthers, subjects were told they might be invited to participate in
a study after the initial trial was over in which they would be guaranteed to
receive the protein, but the informed consent document did not indicate the
length of time that they would receive treatment nor did it guarantee they would

117.
118.
119.
Inc., 441

Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1405.
Id.
See Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 547 n.5 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen,
F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see Mello & Joffe, supra note 107, at 2738

(arguing that the Abney court held that the informed consent document created a contract between
the university and the participants).
120. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 543-44; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 481; Mello & Joffe, supra
note 107, at 2737. Parkinson's disease is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder that involves the
loss of nerve cells in the brain that produce the neurotransmitter dopamine. Symptoms include
motor problems (e.g., tremors) as well as cognitive deficits. The protein at issue in Abney and
Suthers, glial cell line-derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF), was considered a promising treatment
for Parkinson's disease for various reasons, including its positive effect on dopaminergic neuron
survival in vitro. See Erika Check, Second Chance, 13 NATURE MED. 770, 770 (2007); Carrie B.
Hurelbrink & Roger A. Barker, The Potential of GDNF as a Treatment for Parkinson'sDisease,
185 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 1, 1 (2004).
121. SeeAbney, 443 F.3d at 544; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
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be chosen for the follow-up study. 22 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Suthers
claimed that they were promised they would "receive [the protein]
indefinitely. ' 23
After new findings raised safety and efficacy concerns about the protein
used in these two trials, Amgen exercised its discretion to halt the trials and all
use of the protein.124 Following Amgen's decision to stop the trial, the research
participants filed suit against Amgen and moved for a preliminary injunction to
compel the company to provide them with the treatment. 25 The participants
based part of their motion on breach of contract. 26 The plaintiffs in both Abney
and Suthers alleged that the informed consent document created a binding
27
contract through which Amgen was obligated to supply them with the protein.
The Abney and Suthers decisions addressed the participants' contract claims
differently. In Abney, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the informed consent
documents constituted contracts, they did not bind the sponsor, Amgen. 128 The
documents memorialized an agreement between the participants and the
researchers, and the researchers were independent contractors hired by the
sponsor. 129 The court found that, under Kentucky law, independent contractors
could not be considered Amgen's agents or employees. 30 Therefore, any
3
agreement between the researchers and subjects could not bind Amgen.1 1
Because the court concluded that any agreement memorialized in the consent
document did not bind Amgen, it did not reach the question of whether the

122. Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 483-84.
123. Id.at 484.
124. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 544-45. The new findings were: 1)several of the participants had
developed neutralizing antibodies that Amgen worried would clear the synthetic GDNF from the
patients' systems or attack naturally-occurring GDNF, which would result in permanent damage to
vital organs; 2) results from a long-term study of GDNF in primates indicated that some of the
primates had developed cerebral toxicity; and 3) results of the clinical trial indicated that GDNF
was not significantly more effective than placebo. Amgen consulted the FDA before ending the
clinical trial. The FDA allowed but did not compel Amgen to supply GDNF to these patients for
compassionate use. After consulting three bioethicists and five Parkinson's disease experts, Amgen
concluded it should halt use of GDNF. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 545.
125. See id. at 545; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
126. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 546; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
127. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 545, 547; Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
128. Abney, 443 F.3d at 548.
129. Id.
130. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 547; Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14258, at *17
(E.D. Ky. July 8, 2005).
131. Abney, 443 F.3d at 549.
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consent document constituted a contract.' 32
In Suthers, the court concluded that the participants may be able to prove a
set of facts to support the claim that the informed consent document imposed
some contractual obligations on Amgen. 133 However, the court only referred to
the possibility that consent forms could provide evidence for certain contractual
obligations and never referred to the consent forms as contracts. 134 Moreover, the
court concluded that Amgen did not have the specific contractual obligation
asserted by the participants-the obligation to supply the treatment to
participants indefinitely-because the consent document informed participants
that Amgen could halt the clinical trial at any time. 35 By deciding the issues on
these grounds, the court did not reach the question of whether the researchers
were Amgen's agents. 136 The Suthers decision therefore suggests that a consent
obligations, but it also indirectly
form may provide evidence for some contractual 137
distinguishes consent documents from contracts.
In a third case brought against Amgen, the Ninth Circuit addressed an oral
rather than a written contract claim and concluded that the informed consent
document did not support the plaintiffs' claim that Amgen breached an oral
contract. 138 The plaintiffs in Vinion v. Amgen were two individuals suffering from
asbestosis, an incurable lung condition, 139 who entered a clinical trial of Amgen's
drug Enbrel. 140 The plaintiffs alleged that during the initial consent process for

132. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 547.
133. See Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 486. The Suthers court did not reach the question of
whether the investigators were Amgen's agents because it determined that no "clear and
unambiguous" promise of access to GDNF was made. See id
134. See id. at 482-84.
135. See id. at 484.
136. See id. at 486.
137. See Suthers, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 483 ("That the Informed Consent contains language
consistent with the existence of some contractual obligation on the part of Amgen does not answer
the question of whether the contractual promise that plaintiffs seek to impose can be fairly read into
the Informed Consent.").
138. See Vinion v. Amgen, 52 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008).
139. Asbestosis is caused by the inhalation of asbestosis fibers. Asbestosis patients suffer from
scarred lung tissue and progressively decreasing breathing capacity. Asbestosis can cause death or
other serious diseases, including lung cancer. See Thomas A. Sporn & Victor L. Roggli, Asbestosis,
in PATHOLOGY OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASES 71 (Victor L. Roggli, Tim D. Oury & Thomas

A. Sporn, eds., 2004); MayoClinic.com, Asbestosis, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/
asbestosis/DS00482 (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
140. Appellants' Opening Brief at 7-9, Vinion v. Amgen, 252 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008)
(No. 05-36121). Enbrel was approved for the treatment of arthritis but was not approved for the
treatment of asbestosis. See id. at 9.
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the trial, the investigator (who was also their personal physician) made an oral
promise that Amgen would provide them with Enbrel free of charge at the
conclusion of the trial. 141According to the plaintiffs, this oral promise constituted
a contract that Amgen
breached when it did not provide them with Enbrel after
142
the trial concluded.
Both the Montana district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
oral contact claim. 143 The courts examined the consent document, as well as the
contract between Amgen and the principal investigator, to assess the oral contract
claim, concluding that "the written agreements did not contain a promise that the
Companies would provide the study drug for free indefinitely once the study
ended."' 144 Neither court directly addressed the question of whether an informed
consent document constitutes a contract. However, the courts' decisions to look
to the consent documents for evidence of an oral contract suggest a willingness to
use consent documents as evidence of some contractual obligations 145 but not
necessarily as contracts in themselves.
As in Abney, the Vinion court found that the investigators were not acting as
Amgen's agents and therefore could not make oral promises to bind the
company. 46 In her dissent, Judge Betty Fletcher suggested that this finding did
not take adequate account of Montana state law, which allows for agency to be
established in a variety of ways. 147 More specifically, under Montana law, the
mere silence of the principal can create ostensible agency in another party. 4 8 She

141. See id.at 8.
142. See id at 22-29. The plaintiffs could have obtained Enbrel legally through an off-label
prescription; however, the plaintiffs' insurance would not pay for Enbrel, and the plaintiffs could
not afford to purchase Enbrel themselves. See id.
at 8.
143. See Vinion, 52 Fed. Appx. at 584; Vinion v. Amgen, CV 03-202-M-DWM, slip op. at 2
(D. Mont. Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.websupp.org/data/DMT/9:03-cv-00202-166DMT.pdf. In the Ninth Circuit appeal, Judge Betty Fletcher dissented; however, she agreed with the
majority that the plaintiffs' contract claims were properly dismissed by the district court. See
Vinion, 52 Fed. Appx. at 585 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
144. Vinion, 272 Fed. Appx. 582; see also Vinion, CV 03-202-M-DWM, slip op. at 8
("Neither the original Consent Form nor the amended form contained any indication that study
subjects would be entitled to receive Enbrel after the study was terminated or after they were
withdrawn from the study, even if they had shown a positive response to the drug.").
145. See Vinion, 272 Fed. Appx. 582; Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Vinion, CV 03-202-M-DWM, slip op. at 8.
146. Vinion, 272 Fed. Appx. at 584 (affirming that the investigator was not the "Companies'
actual or apparent agent" because "there was no action or inaction by the Companies that would
have led the Appellants to a reasonable belief that [the investigator] was the Companies' agent").
147. Id. at 585 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
148. Id.(citing C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474 (9th
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argued that the informed consent document failed to indicate that the investigator
was not Amgen's agent and that provisions of the document could be read to
imply that the investigator was, in fact, Amgen's agent. 49 Judge Fletcher
contended that, "Inthe present context, while it is true that the nature of clinical
studies requires pharmaceutical companies to let the doctors deal with patients, it
is incumbent upon the companies to make its role and the physician's role clear
at the outset."' 50
The question of whether investigators may be acting as agents of the
research sponsor when obtaining informed consent may vary by state and also by
how the informed consent document describes the relationship between
investigator and sponsor. This agency issue is important because to the extent
that research sponsors employ independent contractors to conduct the research,
informed consent discussions and documents are less likely to support a
contractual claim against the sponsor. Judge Fletcher's opinion suggests that
there may be some legal interpretations that would hold sponsors liable for the
statements made by independent contractors they hire, but only in certain cases.
Of course, the more lucrative contractual claims are those made against research
sponsors, so the increasing use of independent contractors or organizations to
conduct research may decrease incentives to bring suit.
3. Recovery Under PromissoryEstoppel
A recent case tested the viability of using a promissory estoppel theory in
claims for access to experimental therapy. In Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics,
Inc., a teenager seeking access to an unapproved drug for muscular dystrophy
succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction under the theory of promissory
estoppel (or quasi-contract).' 51 The district court found that the company was
obligated to provide access and issued the injunction.152 However, the defendants
filed for interlocutory appeal, and the Third Circuit overturned the decision,
concluding that the district court had abused its discretion because Gunvalson's53
promissory estoppel claim was not reasonably likely to succeed on the merits.

Cir. 2000)).

149. Id.at 586.
150. Id.
at 585.
151. Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., Civ. No. 08-cv-3559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64012, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2008). The plaintiff also moved for the preliminary injunction on
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation grounds; however, because the court
granted the injunction on the promissory estoppel ground, the discussion focuses on that theory. See
id.
152. See id. at *7.
153. See Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 128, 129 (3d Cir. 2008).
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This result is in line with the general trend of courts looking unfavorably on
claims for access to experimental therapy. What is interesting about the
Gunvalson case, however, is that the fact pattern and analysis in the case
illuminate how strong the barriers are to obtaining access to experimental therapy
through litigation.
First, even when plaintiffs craft creative arguments that lower the
evidentiary burdens, it may still be difficult to obtain access to unapproved
treatments. The plaintiff in Gunvalson was Jacob Gunvalson, a sixteen-year-old
boy diagnosed with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD).154 Jacob's mother
became an advocate of DMD research, and through her advocacy work, she
developed a relationship with officers and employees of PTC Therapeutics
(PTC). In 2006, PTC began a Phase 2a clinical trial of PTC124, an unapproved
drug being studied for the treatment of DMD,' 55 in which participants were
selected to receive PTC124 after eligibility was determined using a muscle
biopsy.1 56 At the time, Jacob was enrolled in a different clinical trial, and the
Gunvalsons claimed that PTC's vice president, a friend of the family, advised
them to keep Jacob in that trial, assuring them Jacob could receive PTC 124 at a
later date. 57 This alleged promise became the basis for the Jacob's promissory
estoppel claim. 158 Promissory estoppel claims require less documentary and
testimonial evidence than written or even oral contract claims. In order to obtain
a preliminary injunction, Jacob merely had to demonstrate that his claim had a
reasonable likelihood of success. 159 However, even with this relatively low
evidentiary burden, Jacob's claim ultimately did not succeed.
Second, although some courts may be swayed by the very sympathetic

154. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *2; Malorye Allison, Gunvalson
Decision Sends Shockwaves Through Industry, 11 NATURE BIOTECH. 1201, 1201 (2008).
155. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *11; see also Reed Abelson,
Advocating a Treatment, but Denied Access to It, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2008, at C3; PTC
Therapeutics, About Us, http://www.ptcbio.com/1.0_about-us.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
156. Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *2. PTC conducted the phase 2a trial for
four weeks using thirty-eight participants. See Defendant PTC Therapeutics, Inc.'s Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 6, Gunvalson v. PTC
Therapeutics, Inc., Civ. No. 08-cv-3559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter Defendant PTC Therapeutics' Memorandum].
157. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *3; Brief of Plaintiffs Jacob, John and
Cheri Gunvalson in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Gunvalson v. PTC
Therapeutics, Inc., Civ. No. 08-cv-3559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2008).
158. See Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. at 129-30; Gunvalson, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012 at *3-*4.
159. See Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. at 129-30; Gunvalson, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012 at *4.
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nature of claims for access, as the district court may have been in this case,160
many others will not, as the Third Circuit demonstrated. 61 DMD, the disease
with which Jacob was diagnosed, is a genetic disease without any approved
treatments that causes degenerative deterioration of skeletal and cardiac muscle
tissue, usually leading to death by age twenty-five. 162 The grave nature of Jacob's
condition and his youth may have made his promissory estoppel claim
particularly sympathetic. 63 Indeed, the district court concluded that the
Gunvalsons were reasonably likely to be able to show that PTC had a legal
obligation to provide Jacob PTC124 based on their promissory estoppel claim,
despite the fact that there was a serious question about whether Jacob could show
that he detrimentally relied on the vice president's alleged promise. 164 However,
the Third Circuit overturned the district court's holding based on their conclusion
that Jacob could not demonstrate he had detrimentally relied on the statements
165
that he need not enroll in the earlier trial in order to be eligible for later trials.
The court noted in particular that Mrs. Gunvalson had sent emails expressing her
disappointment that Jacob had been found ineligible for the trial, indicating that
Jacob's reason for not enrolling in the initial trial was his ineligibility, not any
statement that the vice president might have made. 166 The highly sympathetic
160. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012.
161. While the judges of the Third Circuit were not swayed by their sympathies, the opinion
indicates the court was sensitive to the family's circumstances. Gunvalson, 303 Fed. Appx. at 130
("[Wle are sympathetic to the plight of Jacob and his family.... Nevertheless, we are constrained
by the law ... ").
162. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *2; Lisa Phillips, Contract Law and
Ethical Issues Underscore the Latest Lawsuit About Access to Experimental Drugsfor Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy, NEUROLOGY TODAY, Sept. 2008, at 20, 20.

163. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *14-*16 (noting that the harm to Jacob
without access to the medication is much greater than the harm to PTC in distributing the
medication and describing the Gunvalson's unique relationship with PTC's vice president); see also
Gunvalson, 303 Fed. Appx. at 130 (noting the court's sympathy for the Gunvalson family).
164. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *7. Specifically, there was some
question about whether Jacob had the correct diagnosis to be eligible for PTC's Phase 2a trial. PTC
Therapeutics argued that when it was enrolling participants in the Phase 2a trial, Jacob was
diagnosed with Becker Muscular Dystrophy (BMD), not DMD. Only patients diagnosed with DMD
were eligible to participate in clinical trials of PTC124. Thus, according to PTC, Jacob did not
enroll in the trial because he was ineligible, not because he relied on a promise made by the vice
president. But the district court found that "the evidence suggests that Jacob actually does have
DMD, not BMD." See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *13.
165. See Gunvalson, 303 Fed. Appx. at 130.
166. See id at 130 n.6 ("It is apparent from the record [that Jacob's ineligibility] is the real
reason [Ms. Gunvalson] did not attempt to enroll Jacob in the Phase 2a trial, as Mrs. Gunvalson emailed a number of parties reporting her disappointment upon hearing of his ineligibility.").
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nature of Jacob's claim did not sway the Third Circuit to interpret the evidence in
his favor.
Third, the major bottleneck in claims for access may be neither the FDA nor
the courts, but rather the drug companies themselves, who are wary of granting
access in a way that may interfere with obtaining final approval for the drug in
question.1 67 Prior to initiating litigation, Jacob asked PTC to provide him the drug
through "an FDA-regulated 'compassionate use' exception."'' 68 PTC refused
Jacob's request because it feared that allowing individual access to PTC124
outside of the clinical trials would hinder its ability to enroll participants in the
Phase 2b clinical trial and delay the approval of PTC124. 169 Thus, this case
illustrates that because drug companies may have many reasons not to allow
access, the most effective approach may be to address companies' incentives.
In sum, although informed consent documents have been interpreted to give
rise to contractual obligations in some cases, this change may not forecast a rise
in successful claims. Courts have generally looked unfavorably on contractual
claims seeking access to experimental therapy.170 Even when plaintiffs have
sympathetic claims that are carefully crafted to lower their evidentiary burdens,
courts are still wary of granting litigants access to unapproved drugs, as the Third
Circuit decision in Gunvalson demonstrated. Nevertheless, there are a few
exceptions to this trend, including Dahl and the district court's decision in
Gunvalson.171 Thus, pharmaceutical companies and research sponsors may still
rightly fear litigation costs, novel legal claims, and the uncertainty of litigation.
In the next section, we examine the reasons for judicial reluctance to grant access
and conclude that they are warranted.

167. See, e.g., George J.Annas, Cancer and the Constitution- Choice at Life's End, 357 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 408, 411 (2007) ("[T]he major bottleneck in the compassionate-use program has
never been the FDA. The manufacturers have no incentives to make their investigational products
available outside clinical trials.").
168. See Gunvalson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012, at *4.
169. See id.(noting that PTC denied Jacob's request for compassionate use); Defendant PTC
Therapeutics' Memorandum, supra note 156, at 8 (arguing that allowing access outside of the
clinical trials will hinder PTC's ability to enroll participants in its trials and gain FDA approval);
PTC
Therapeutics,
PTC
News,
Appeals
Court
Rules
for
PTC,
http://www.ptcbio.com/PTCStatement.l_news.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009) ("The sooner we
can complete the required clinical trials and get this drug approved, the sooner all who suffer from
the type of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) addressed by PTC 124 may benefit.").
170. See Vinion v. Amgen Inc., 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008); Abney v. Amgen, Inc.,
443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
171. See Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993); Gunvalson, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64012. But see Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 128, 129
(3d Cir. 2008) (vacating the lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction).
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B. Why Courts Should Not Consider ContractualClaims Brought by Former or
PotentialResearch Subjects

Courts may not be well-placed to assess whether claims for access to
unapproved therapy should be granted. In fact, judges appear to be reluctant to
recognize the right to medical self-defense because doing so would require the
judicial branch to decide complex issues related to science and medicine.' 72 The
Supreme Court has held that the judiciary has limited institutional competence
when "making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where linedrawing is inherently complex." 173 Instead, Congress and administrative agencies
are deemed the appropriate governmental bodies
to make controversial policy
1 74
decisions in the context of scientific uncertainty.
Courts and scholars have offered various reasons why legislatures, rather
than courts, generally should make complicated policy decisions. The legislature
175
can consider the broad and long-term effects of a particular choice.
Conversely, "[the] basic function of courts is . . . the function of settling
disputes" based on past facts and present law. 176 Legislatures may also consider a
wider range of facts and evidence than courts may consider, 177 or they may

172. Cooper, supra note 77, at 40. For example, a court may be asked to determine whether a
terminally ill patient truly has no treatment options other than an unapproved drug.
173. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006); see also
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) ("When Congress undertakes to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and
courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation, even assuming, arguendo, that judges with
more direct exposure to the problem might make wiser choices.").
174. See Snead, supra note 20, at 12 ("[A]s with other contested matters in a morally
pluralistic society, this issue must be resolved in the public square through the democratic
process.").
175. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (holding that Congress should

consider "the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society"); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) ("A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its
purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions
by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.").
176. Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislature: Some Legal Process Perspectives
and Possibilities,38 AKRON L. REV. 895, 921 (2005) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATIONS OF LAW 343
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (holding that a court's "task is the
more limited one of interpreting the law as it now stands").

177. See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
FederalConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 701 (2000).
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178
develop the necessary evidence by holding hearings or commissioning studies.
Congress and administrative agencies also possess the freedom to
experiment with policy solutions that can later be changed; courts do not have the
same degree of flexibility.' 7 9 For example, if the FDA's regulations pertaining to
access to unapproved drugs are inadequate, the regulations can be modified
through new regulations or a change to the FDCA. 8 0 This freedom to experiment
with various policy solutions may be especially useful for scientific questions,
which involve continuously evolving technology. Conversely, if circumstances
warrant a change in the interpretation of the law, a court must wait for an
appropriate controversy to present itself before making the necessary change.
Once a court has made a change, it cannot make any necessary adjustments or
overturn its previous decision until a new controversy arises.
In addition, the legislature, unlike the judiciary, is directly subject to political
pressure and public opinion. 18 Through the democratic process, the public can
express its disapproval of a particular policy or policies by voting legislators out
of office. 82 Legislative decisions, therefore, are more likely to take into account
majoritarian values and contain inherent democratic legitimacy. 83 Such
legitimacy may be important in situations that require the government to balance
conflicting goals, such as early availability for promising new drugs and
obtaining sufficient information about the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals.
It may be appropriate for courts to decide policy issues when the political

178. See id; cf Cooper, supra note 77, at 40 (noting that the FDA has unique access to the
results of clinical trials, and personnel with the scientific expertise needed to evaluate the data).
Additionally, these arguments may be construed as arguments in favor of judicial deference to
legislative bodies. However, authors like Cooper discuss the broader policy implications of
allowing courts to decide scientific and policy issues, and not the narrower legal question of
whether Chevron deference is warranted in the face of agency expertise, and we have followed suit.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the
legal test for determining when courts should defer to administrative agencies' statutory
interpretations).
179. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("Legislative bodies have broad scope to
experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to 'subject the State to an
intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the
protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure."'
(quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932))).
180. See Cooper, supra note 77, at 40.
181. See Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1129, 1134 (1992).
182. See id
183. See id
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process has failed.184 However, in the context of medical self-defense, there is
little evidence that this has occurred. 185 Instead, the evidence suggests that the
political process has functioned appropriately to address the issue of access to
unapproved drugs. 186 After Abigail Alliance filed suit against the FDA, a bill was
introduced into the Senate that would have expanded access to unapproved drugs,
and the FDA proposed new regulations that
clarified and expanded its access
87
programs, which will be discussed below.'
Courts also may not be the appropriate venue for consideration of claims to
access experimental therapy because they wield powerful equitable tools,
including preliminary injunctions. 188 At the preliminary injunction stage, courts
simply have to assess whether a claim is reasonably likely to succeed, and they
may rule as the district court did in Gunvalson.189 From the perspective of a
patient seeking access to experimental therapy, a preliminary injunction requiring
a company to provide the experimental therapy is exactly the relief desired.1 9°
This approach would be likely to result in a piecemeal approach to granting
access to experimental therapy. Moreover, courts may not be well-placed to sift
through data from preclinical and Phase 1 and 2 studies to determine whether
receiving experimental therapy poses any risks to the litigant. The sympathetic
nature of claims to access experimental therapy may lead courts to make
compassionate decisions that would not work at a policy level. 191 In Gunvalson,

184. See Cooper, supra note 77, at 41. Some might argue that the Court's intervention in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) to move the racial integration of schools
forward was an example of a judicial response to a failure of the political processes.
185. See Cooper, supra note 77, at 42.
186. See id
187. See id.; see also Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed.
Reg. 75,147 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312) (providing the text of the
proposed changes to FDA's access regulations); Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,168, 75,172-73 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312) (providing the text
of the proposed changes to FDA's regulations concerning prices for unapproved drugs). See
Sections III.A-E, infra, for a discussion of the proposed regulations.
188. See, e.g., Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 128, 128 n.3 (3d Cir.
2008).
189. See id.
190. Cf Michael M. Grynbaum, Judge Orders Drug Maker To Provide Experimental
Treatment to Terminally ]I Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at C3 (quoting Gunvalson's
attorney saying, "[t]his was the relief that we sought," after the district court granted the
preliminary injunction).
191. See Gunvalson, 303 Fed. Appx. at 130 ("As we explained in open court following oral
argument, we are sympathetic to the plight of Jacob and his family. . . .Nevertheless, we are
constrained by the law to conclude that the Gunvalsons cannot demonstrate either a clear and

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

X:I (2010)

the Third Circuit appeared to have 92
recognized the danger of these tools when it
overturned the district court ruling. 1
Finally, courts should be wary of opening the floodgates of litigation.
Contract law offers a variety of claims that plaintiffs can bring. Courts have now
litigated claims in contract law that alleged bilateral contracts, unilateral
contracts, oral contracts, and promissory estoppel.193 The fact that these types of
claims have been for the most part unsuccessful may not fully stem the tide of
litigation on claims for access to experimental therapy.' 94 The possible claims for
plaintiffs are varied enough that courts should be wary of encouraging further
litigation in this area. For all of these reasons, courts are appropriately reluctant
to provide litigants access to unapproved drugs.
III. EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS PROVIDING EXPANDED ACCESS TO

UNAPPROVED DRUGS
Given that the courts may not have the institutional competence to address
claims for access to unapproved therapy, a more appropriate way to handle these
claims may be through regulation. After the D.C. Circuit panel decision in
Abigail Alliance, the FDA issued a proposed rule to modify its expanded access
regulations. 95 The FDA intended that the new rule would broaden the
availability of investigational drugs through increasing awareness of expanded
access programs and procedures and by "eas[ing] the administrative burdens on
individual physicians seeking investigational drugs for their patients, as well as
the burdens on sponsors who make investigational drugs available for treatment
use."

196

In August 2009, the FDA published a final version of the rule that
establishes three programs through which terminally and seriously ill patients
may access unapproved drugs. 197 The three programs are based on the size of the

definite promise or detrimental reliance, requirements for a promissory estoppel claim.").
192. See id.
193. See id; Vinion v. Amgen Inc., 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008); Abney v. Amgen,
Inc., 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir.
1993); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
194. Cf Mello, supra note 100, at 43 (arguing that research-related litigation is likely to
increase).
195. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147
(proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312); Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail
Alliance. The Reality Behind the Right To Get Experimental Drugs, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1058

(2008).
196. Id.
197. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900
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patient population seeking access: 1) treatment use (for "widespread" use), 2)
intermediate-size patient population use, and 3) individual use.1 98 The rule
establishes different criteria and risk-benefit ratios for the different patient
population sizes, 199 although it is not clear why different standards are
justified.2 °0 In addition to the three expanded access programs, the rule clarifies
the FDA's policy regarding what sponsors are permitted to charge expanded
access patients. 201
A. GeneralRequirements and Safeguardsfor Access
For a patient to legally receive an unapproved drug outside of clinical trials
under the three expanded access programs, two conditions must be met. Not only
must the FDA approve an expanded access application for treatment use or
individual use, but the drug sponsor must agree to provide expanded access to an
unapproved drug. 202 As mentioned above, many sponsors may believe it is not in
their best interest to apply for and provide expanded access, and the FDA has no
authority to mandate the provision of an unapproved drug by an unwilling
sponsor. 203
The final rule also outlines some requirements and safeguards that are
applicable to all three programs,20 4 which are provided in Tables 1 and 2 below.

(Aug. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312). Prior to the publication of the final rule, there
were only two programs-treatment use and individual use-relevant to the discussion of
terminally ill patients' attempts to gain access to unapproved drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a), (c)
(2006); 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (2008).
198. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,900.
199. See id. at 40,944-45.
200. The individual use program establishes more lenient eligibility criteria than do the
programs intended to provide access to larger groups of patients. However, it may be unfair to
create more lenient eligibility criteria for individual patients, who, as the earliest to seek access, are
likely to be relatively affluent and connected. Expanded access programs are likely not very
accessible for the poor, uninformed, and unconnected. But see Judy Vale, Expanding Expanded
Access: How the Foodand DrugAdministration Can Achieve Better Access to ExperimentalDrugs
for Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2161-62 (2008) (arguing that more lenient criteria for
individual patients is appropriate).
201. See Charging for Investigational Drugs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,872 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. 312).
202. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34, 312.36 (2008) (not mentioning any authority to force drug
companies to provide expanded access).
203. See id.
204. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,943-44.
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20 5

Table 1: Requirements
1) Patients have a "serious 20 6 or immediately life-threatening disease, 20 7 and no
alternative treatment.
2) The potential benefits justify the potential risks.
3) Expanded access does not interfere with clinical trials to support marketing
approval.
20 8

Table 2: Safeguards
1) A physician who treats expanded access patients is considered an
' 20 9
investigator, and "must comply with the responsibilities for investigators. '
2) A drug company or physician who applied for expanded access on behalf of
patients is a sponsor (or sponsor-investigator),
and "must comply with the
210
responsibilities for sponsors.,

B. Treatment Use

Treatment use is directed at groups of patients, rather than individuals, and is
intended to allow "widespread" access.2 1 Under the final rule, the treatment use
program does not differ significantly from the treatment use program under the
212
The final rule suggests that drugs should not be made
former regulations.

205. Id.at 40,943.
206. A serious disease is defined as "a disease or condition associated with morbidity that has
substantial impact on day-to-day functioning. Short-lived and self-limiting morbidity will usually
not be sufficient, but the morbidity need not be irreversible, provided it is persistent or recurrent.
Whether a disease or condition is serious is a matter of clinical judgment, based on its impact on
such factors as survival, day-to-day functioning, or the likelihood that the disease, if left untreated,
will progress from a less severe condition to a more serious one." Expanded Access to
Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,943.
207. An immediately life-threatening disease is "a stage of disease in which there is
reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death
is likely without early treatment." Id.
208. Id.at 40,943-44.
209. Investigator responsibilities include reporting adverse events to the sponsor and ensuring
that informed consent requirements are met. See id. at 40,943.
210. Sponsor responsibilities include submitting safety reports to the FDA and ensuring
physician-investigators are qualified to administer the unapproved drug. See id.at 40,943-44.
211. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,945.
212. Compare Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
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available earlier than Phase 2 clinical trials, but it does not mandate that
timeline. z13 In addition to the general requirements, three criteria must be
satisfied in order for a drug to be provided under the treatment access program:
1) the drug must be in clinical trials or clinical trials must have been completed;
2) the sponsor must be pursuing approval with due diligence; and 3) there must
be sufficient scientific or clinical evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the
drug to support the expanded access use. The final rule also requires sponsors to
ensure that2 1investigators
comply with the research protocol and applicable
4
regulations.

C. Intermediate-Size PatientPopulation Use
The intermediate-size patient population expanded access program
represents the final rule's most significant change to the former regulations.2 15
Intermediate-size patient population use is intended to provide expanded access
to "a patient population smaller than that typical of a treatment [Investigational
New Drug (IND)] or treatment protocol," a group of a size not mentioned in the
previous regulations.216
The final rule establishes two safeguards for intermediate use: 1) each year,

40,945 (allowing the FDA to permit widespread treatment use of experimental drugs if the patients
have a life-threatening illness, the drug is being investigated in clinical trials, and the sponsor is
actively pursuing marketing approval), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c) (2006) (allowing the granting of
expanded access of an investigational new drug if there is no alternative therapy available, the drug
is being investigated under clinical trials, and the sponsor of the drug is pursuing marketing
approval), and 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008) (allowing the FDA to permit treatment use of an
investigational drug if there is no alternative treatment, the drug is being investigated in clinical
trials, and the sponsor is pursuing marketing approval).
213. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,945.
214. See id
215. Compare Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,944-45 (allowing the FDA to permit investigational drugs to be used for intermediate-size
patient populations under certain circumstances), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006) (allowing access
to investigational drugs only for individual patients and widespread use), and 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34,
312.36 (2008) (describing how an investigational drug may be made available to patients with lifethreatening diseases in accordance with a treatment protocol or treatment IND); see also Alice K.
Marcee, Expanded Access to Phase II Clinical Trials in Oncology: A Step Toward Increasing
Scientific Validity and Compassion, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439, 447 (2008) (noting that the "midsize group access is a new category").
216. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,926;
Marcee, supra note 215, at 447.
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the FDA will reassess whether expanded access is appropriate, 2 17 and 2) sponsors
must ensure that researchers comply with protocol requirements and relevant
regulations. Table 3 outlines the three criteria for intermediate-size population
use.

2 18

Table 3: Intermediate-Size Population Use Criteria 2 19
1) "There is enough evidence that the drug is safe at the dose and duration
proposed for expanded access use to justify a clinical trial" in a population
similar in size to the proposed expanded access population.
2) There must be "preliminary clinical evidence of effectiveness of the drug, or
of a plausible pharmacologic effect of the drug to make expanded access use a
reasonable therapeutic option."
3) Sponsors must explain in their applications why patients cannot be enrolled
in clinical trials, and if drug is not being developed for marketing, why this is
the case.
One of the most significant changes in the final rule for intermediate-size use
is that it allows "off-label" expanded access (access for patients with a disease
other than the one the drug is intended to treat). Sponsors typically study an
unapproved drug's safety and efficacy for one indication, even if there is reason
to believe that the drug would be safe and effective for other conditions.22 ° Some
patients like Abigail Burroughs 22' have diseases that are not being studied in
clinical trials, and may have great difficulty obtaining access to unapproved
medications. For patients like these, allowing off-label expanded access may be
critically important in that it offers access to individuals who cannot obtain
access through clinical trials.
In addition, the intermediate-size program allows access to drugs not being
developed for marketing because they are intended to treat a particularly rare
217. In its reassessment, the FDA will consider "whether it is possible to conduct a clinical
study of the expanded access use," "whether providing the investigational drug for expanded access
use is interfering with the clinical development of the drug," and whether the number of patients
seeking access has increased such that FDA should ask the sponsor to submit an application for a
treatment use program. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 40,945.
218. See id. at 40,945-46.
219. See id.
220. Cf Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181, 186-87 (1999)
(explaining that FDA approves drugs for particular conditions).
221. See, e.g., Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205.
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condition.2 2 This change is significant because patients with rare conditions may
be unfairly barred from expanded access programs if a sponsor halts clinical
trials of an unapproved drug because the market for the drug is too small to be
profitable.22 3 The final rule also provides for access to approved drugs that have
off the market or have the same active ingredient as approved
been taken
224
drugs.
D. Individual Use
The final rule's individual use program establishes eligibility criteria similar
to the previous individual use program.25 The final rule requires that, in addition
to the general requirements, two criteria must be met for a patient to gain access
to an unapproved drug through the individual use program: 1) a "physician must
determine that the probable risk to the person from the investigational drug is not
greater than the probable risk from the disease," and 2) the patient must not be
able to obtain the drug through clinical trials or another expanded access
program.22 6
The most significant new criterion in the final rule is the second one-that a
patient on the individual use program must not also be eligible to receive the
unapproved drug through a clinical trial or other type of expanded access
program. Although the prior regulations mandated that the FDA allow individual
use only when it would not interfere with clinical trials,2 27 the final rule's more
specific requirement that individuals be allowed expanded access only if they
cannot receive the unapproved drug as a participant in a clinical trial is a stronger
protection. If strictly enforced, it may help to ensure that expanded access
programs will not interfere with or impede the completion of clinical trials. This
addition should provide reassurance to sponsors that allowing expanded access
will not delay the approval process. Protecting the integrity of clinical trials in
this fashion is also important to ensure that wider access to approved drugs is not
delayed or prevented by the interests of those seeking expanded access to
unapproved drugs.

222. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at

40,944.
223. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b) (2008) (permitting expanded access only if the sponsor is

pursuing full marketing approval with due diligence).
224. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,944.
225. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b) (2006); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for
Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,943-44.
226. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,944.
227. See 21 U.S.C § 360bbb(b) (2006).
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The final rule also creates four additional safeguards for patients. 228 First,
treatment is limited to "a single course of therapy for a specified duration unless
the FDA expressly authorizes multiple courses or chronic therapy., 229 Second,
the FDA may require a sponsor to monitor the patient receiving individual access
if the treatment lasts for an extended length of time. 230 Third, if more than a few
patients request individual use, the FDA may require a sponsor to submit a
treatment use application. 231 Finally, at the conclusion of the individual use, the
sponsor or investigator must provide the FDA "a written summary of the results
232
of the expanded access use, including any adverse effects.
These additional safeguards may help to ensure the safety of the individual
use patients and to encourage the collection of data provided by individual use
patients. However, these safeguards are still less protective than those that have
been designed for clinical trials. Clinical trials are typically subject to safety
monitoring by external committees such as Institutional Review Boards 233 and
Data and Safety Monitoring Committees.2 34 Usually, trials must be halted if
significant safety concerns arise.235 These protections are not completely
replicated by the FDA's regulations for expanded access programs and may not
be possible to replicate in the context of expanded access. When a few
individuals obtain access at varied locations across the country without being
connected to a particular trial site, the potential for rigorous safety monitoring is
greatly reduced.
E. Costs that a Drug Sponsor May Recover
One of the major goals the FDA had for the final rule was to extend its

228. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,944.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id
233. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2008) (requiring Institutional Review Board review of research).
234. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL SPONSORS: ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnfornation/Guidances/UCM 126578.pdf
(recommending Data and Safety Monitoring Boards for "large, randomized multisite studies that
evaluate treatments intended to prolong life or reduce risk of a major adverse health outcome," and
for any controlled trial of any size that will compare rates of mortality or major morbidity).
235. Michael A. Morse et al., Monitoringand Ensuring Safety During ClinicalResearch, 285
JAMA 1201, 1201 (2001) (explaining the oversight function of institutional review boards and data
monitoring committees or data and safety monitoring boards).
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previous charging regulations to cover all types of expanded access programs and
236
to describe more specifically the types of costs that sponsors may recover.
Sponsors typically are allowed to charge expanded access patients for the
unapproved drug for one year from the time of FDA authorization, unless the
FDA approves a different time period.237 Sponsors must meet three criteria for
charging patients. First, they must justify the amount they plan to charge and
obtain prior written approval from the FDA.238 Second, the sponsor must provide
the FDA with "reasonable assurance that charging will not interfere with
developing the drug for marketing approval., 239 Third, the sponsor cannot charge
to receive unapproved drugs through the
patients who are not authorized
24
0
program.
access
expanded
For all three types of expanded access programs, sponsors may recover "the
direct costs of making [the] investigational drug available., 24' For treatment use
and intermediate-size patient population use programs sponsors may recover
some additional costs, which are described in the following table.242
for Treatment Use and
,Table 4: Costs that the Sponsor May Recover,,
243
Intermediate-size Patient Populations
1) The cost of "monitoring the expanded access protocol" and other
administrative costs directly associated with the expanded access.
2) The cost of complying with reporting requirements.
3) "[O]ther administrative costs directly associated with the expanded access."
The final rule's charging regulation offers two benefits when compared with
236. See Charging for Investigational Drugs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,872, 40,872 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
237. See id. at 40,899.
238. See id.
239. For treatment use, the assurance must include at least three items: 1) "[e]vidence of
sufficient enrollment in any ongoing clinical trial(s) ... to reasonably assure FDA that the trial(s)
will be successfully completed as planned"; 2) "[e]vidence of adequate progress in the development
of the drug for marketing approval"; and 3) "[i]nformation submitted under the general
investigational plan specifying the drug development milestones the sponsor plans to meet in the
next year." Id. This provision appears to safeguard against creating a novel business model in
which a company only develops drugs until the expanded access phase and never seeks full
approval.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See id at 40,899-900.
243. See id.
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the previous regulation. First, the final rule explicitly applies to all types of
expanded access regulations, 244 while the current regulations do not explicitly
address permissible charging practices for individual use. 245 Second, the final rule
provides more explicit guidance for sponsors regarding what are permissible
charges. For example, the proposed regulation provides specific examples of
direct costs that a sponsor may recover, including "raw materials, labor, and
nonreusable supplies and equipment used to manufacture the quantity of drug"
and "costs to acquire the drug from another manufacturing source, and direct
costs to ship and handle (e.g., store) the drug., 246 The extent to which these
clarifications in the final rule are truly beneficial is difficult to anticipate, but as
we discuss below,

247

it is not clear that an ability to recover costs is the major

bottleneck impeding access to unapproved therapy.
F. Alternative Proposalsto FDA Regulations
Some commentators have argued that the existing FDA regulations overly
restrict which patients are eligible for expanded access.

248

Scholars have offered

two proposals that would deregulate expanded access to varying degrees. One
proposal would allow completely open, deregulated access to unapproved drugs,
while the second proposal would amend the FDCA to lessen FDA control of
expanded access. 2 4 9 Both deregulation proposals emphasize the importance of
patient autonomy.25 ° Incidentally, proponents of both proposals also have argued
that a constitutional right to access exists and that Abigail Alliance was wrongly
decided.25 1

244. See id.
245. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2008).
246. Charging for Investigational Drugs, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,899. The final rule also provides
examples of indirect costs that sponsors may not recover, including "costs for facilities and
equipment used to manufacture the supply of investigational drug, but that are primarily intended to
produce large quantities of drug for eventual commercial sale[] and ... other costs that would be
incurred even if the.., treatment use for which charging is authorized did not occur." Id.
247. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
248. See Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of ExpandingAccess to UnapprovedDrugs, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 318 (2007); Vale, supra note 200, at 2160.
249. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical
Decisionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 577-80 (2008) (describing open access
and the amendments to the FDCA); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatmentsfor HIV and
AIDS: A ContractarianModel of Access, 11 YALE J. REG. 401, 420-22 (1994) (describing open
access, existing regulations, and a contractarian model).
250. See Epstein, supra note 249; Salbu, supra note 249.
251. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 249, at 577; Robert M. Harper, A Matter of Life and Death:
Affording Terminally Ill PatientsAccess to Post-PhaseI Investigational New Drugs, 12 MICH. ST.
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1.Open Access
A few scholars have argued for open access, in which patients may elect to
take any unapproved drug that a company will provide and the FDA does not

regulate expanded access at all.252 Open access supporters have acknowledged
that most unapproved drugs are eventually proven ineffective or unsafe.253

However, they argue that an open access model does not threaten the state's
interest in promoting public health because the state's interest is limited when
"the individual is terminally ill."' 254 Moreover, proponents of open access contend
that the clinical trials process fails to achieve the public health goal of producing

a market of safe and efficacious drugs.2 55 Consequently, they argue that the
emphasis of the expanded access debate should not be on the state's public health

interests but on the importance of patient autonomy.256 Open access supporters
claim that patients are the best parties to decide whether an unapproved drug is
an appropriate treatment and in their best interests.257

U. J. MED. & L. 265, 286-87 (2008).
252. See Epstein, supra note 249, at 574-80; Salbu, supra note 249, at 420-22. Salbu actually
supports a "contractarian" model of access, which he distinguishes from open access on the
assumption that open access would require drug companies to provide unapproved drugs to patients
who want them. See Salbu, supra note 249, at 429-30. However, other scholars do not advocate an
open access model that would require companies to provide unapproved drugs. Instead, they
characterize open access the way Salbu characterizes the contractarian model-as a model allowing
parties to contract for the sale or purchase of unapproved drugs without government interference or
regulation. See Epstein, supra note 249, at 574-80. Thus, we do not distinguish between open
access and contractarian models.
253. See Epstein, supra note 249, at 578.
254. Salbu, supra note 249, at 430. Salbu appears to limit this argument to cases in which the
terminally ill patient also has no FDA-approved treatments; it is not clear that Epstein would
similarly limit the argument.
255. See Epstein, supra note 249, at 578 ("It is easy to point to particular cases in which a
fuller trial has indicated the imprudence of resorting to certain kinds of therapies. But a fuller
analysis would also have to include those cases in which the gold-standard approach confirmed the
informal field judgment but nonetheless delayed the delivery of the treatment to the market.");
Salbu, supra note 249, at 421 ("Open-access arguments are further strengthened by the claim that
the stringent drug review processes of the 1962 Amendments fail to achieve the ultimate goal of the
paternalistic model: the pursuit of public health and safety."). According to open access supporters,
open access to unapproved drugs may even help to enhance clinical trials by providing information
about use of drugs in a larger number of patients. See Salbu, supra note 249, at 432.
256. Epstein, supra note 249, at 579.
257. See id.;
see also Salbu, supra note 249, at 420 ("[T]he open-access model is built on a
vision of unconstrained patient autonomy and self-determination.").
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2. The ACCESSAct

Several commentators have argued that enacting the Access, Compassion,
Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act (ACCESS Act) would best provide
terminally ill patients' access to unapproved drugs.2 5 8 The ACCESS Act, first

introduced in the Senate in 2005, would amend the FDCA to create a tiered
approval process for drugs. 259 The ACCESS Act was intended to offer a

compromise position between complete
patient autonomy and some FDA control
260

of the expanded access process.
Under the ACCESS Act, if Phase I clinical trials provided preliminary
evidence of effectiveness and safety of a drug, and if the drug company was
actively pursuing drug approval, the FDA could approve the drug for limited
marketing. 261 The FDA could also permit the company to sell the drug for a
profit.262 Patients seeking access to drugs prior to full marketing approval would
be required to waive their right to file suit against a drug company. 263
Supporters, including Abigail Alliance, claim that adopting the ACCESS
Act would appropriately balance individual autonomy and the public health need
for safe and effective drugs and would also address some of the practical
problems associated with expanded access programs.2 64 According to its
proponents, the ACCESS Act would not interfere with enrollment in clinical

trials because, in order to be eligible for early access, patients have to exhaust all
available treatment and clinical trial options.265 ACCESS Act supporters argue

258. See Harper, supra note 251, at 286-87; see also Amy Heverly, Abigail Alliance is Not the
End: A Legislative Solution to a Human Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 842-47 (2008)
(advocating legislation consistent with the ACCESS Act with some modifications); Linda
Katherine Leibfarth, Note, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A Casefor Expanded
Access to Experimental Drugs through the PoliticalProcess, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2008)
(endorsing the ACCESS Act with some modifications).
259. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. (2005); see Harper, supra note 251, at 287.
260. See Epstein, supra note 249, at 577-78 ("It is clear that the structure of this bill is meant
to compromise between the demands for individual access and the demands for public
protection.").
261. See Harper, supra note 251, at 287 (noting that this option is available for sponsors
seeking full marketing approval); see also Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill
Patients Act, H.R. 6270, 110th Cong. (2008).
262. See H.R. 6270.
263. See id
264. See Harper, supra note 251, at 290.
265. See Harper, supra note 258, at 289-90; see also Heverly, supra note 258, at 844 (arguing
that the ACCESS Act will not interfere with clinical trial enrollment if it is modified such that only
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that it will increase drug companies' incentives to provide expanded access by
allowing them to profit from expanded access sales.266 The ACCESS Act is also
intended to decrease drug companies' disincentives to provide access by
liability against drug companies and physicians
requiring patients to waive
267
administering the drugs.

The ACCESS Act is the only proposal that directly addresses physician
liability. 268 Under the FDA's final rule, physicians who treat patients with

unapproved drugs through expanded access protocols would be responsible for
meeting various regulatory requirements, such as reporting adverse events.269
Ordinarily, physicians may be sued under any of the theories common to
research-related litigation or under theories of malpractice for treating patients
with unapproved drugs.27 ° In contrast to the FDA's regulations, the ACCESS Act
would require patients to waive their right to hold physicians liable for adverse
events that occur during treatment through an expanded access program.2 71 It is
not clear whether the ACCESS Act would also waive physicians' liability for
failing to meet regulatory reporting requirements.27
These proposals for greatly expanding access to unapproved therapy would
have a number of negative downstream consequences that their proponents do
not fully acknowledge. In light of these consequences, we argue in the next
section that these proposals are not in society's interest and that access to

the sickest patients are eligible and personal physicians cannot make clinical trial eligibility
determinations); Leibfarth, supra note 258, at 1313-14 (arguing that the ACCESS act will not
interfere with clinical trial enrollment if FDA promulgates additional regulations prohibiting
patients currently enrolled in a clinical trial from leaving the trial to receive expanded access to a
drug).
266. See Heverly, supra note 258, at 846; Abigail Alliance Website, supra note 6.
267. See Harper, supra note 251, at 289; see also Heverly, supra note 258, at 846 (arguing for
allowing drug companies to profit from early access sales, but against a complete waiver of sponsor
liability); Leibfarth, supra note 258, at 1311-13 (supporting the profit and waiver provisions, but
arguing for some marketing restrictions additional to those in the ACCESS Act).
268. See H.R. 6270.
269. See id.
270. See Talbott, supra note 248, at 317.
271. See H.R. 6270.
272. See id. ("No claim or cause of action against a... physician who ... supplies, distributes
or prescribes a product subject to an approved Compassionate Investigational Access application
shall exist in any Federal or State court for claims of property, personal injury, or death caused by,
arising out of, or relating to the design, development, clinical testing and investigation,
manufacture, labeling, distribution, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing,
administration, efficacy, or use of a drug, biological product, or device subject to an approved
Compassionate Investigational Access application.").
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unapproved drugs should be offered only under very limited circumstances.
IV. AVOIDING A POLICY OF EXCEPTIONS: THE ARGUMENT FOR VERY LIMITED
ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL THERAPY

There are two reasons why access to experimental therapies should be
granted only in very limited situations, if at all. First, because there are
significant safety and efficacy concerns about unapproved drugs, patients should
not receive access to those drugs at early stages outside the context of clinical
trials. Second, the solutions proposed attempt to further the interests of a few
individuals at significant cost to society. Rather than drafting policy around these
exceptional cases, it would be better to reform the general approval process for
drugs. Our focus should be on testing interventions efficiently but carefully and
making them available to the market as soon as that can be safely achieved.
A. Highly Uncertain Safety and Efficacy

Access to unapproved therapy should be limited because of the considerable
uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of unapproved drugs. It is difficult to
overstate the importance of data in determining whether and when medical
interventions should be made available to the public. There are several examples
of drugs or procedures that were disseminated without being tested sufficiently
and resulted in large costs to our health care system, resulting in many patients
being subjected to great risk for no clear benefit. 273 The most prominent example
is a treatment for breast cancer-high dose chemotherapy and autologous bone
marrow transplant-that was effectively adopted as the standard of care before it
could be validated in clinical trials. 274 Clinicians and patients were so convinced
of its effectiveness that clinical trials were delayed for many years. Yet, when
clinical trials were finally conducted, it became clear that the risky procedure
offered no benefit over standard, less-risky chemotherapeutic regimens and had

273. See generally David Atkins et al., Making Policy When the Evidence is in Dispute, 24
HEALTH AFF. 102 (2005) (discussing the controversies surrounding screening for prostate cancer,
high-dose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant for breast cancer, antibiotic use, and newborn
hearing screening).
274. See generally Cynthia M. Farquhar et al., High Dose Chemotherapyfor Poor Prognosis
Breast Cancer: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 33 CANCER TREATMENT REvS. 325 (2007);
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose Chemotherapy with
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant ForBreast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101 (2001); H.G. Welch
& J. Mogielnicki, Presumed Benefit: Lessons from the American Experience with Marrow
Transplantationfor Breast Cancer, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1088 (2002).
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even caused harm. 275 Another example is found in knee surgery-after many
years of use, arthroscopic lavage or debridement for osteoarthritis of the knee
was found to be no more effective than placebo surgery. 276
Of all of the drugs that are tested in humans, the vast majority of potential
therapeutic agents never make it through the approval process. 2 77 In Europe and
the United States, for every nine compounds that undergo drug testing, only one
will ultimately receive regulatory approval.278 A given therapy may fail for a
number of reasons, but the main reason that drugs fail is that they simply do not
work.279 In 2000, the majority of drug failures were due to lack of efficacy, with
safety concerns a close second. 280 The drug approval process typically involves
three phases of testing, 28 1 and the Abigail Alliance sought access to unapproved
drugs after the first phase. Significantly, however, over 60% of treatments fail
after Phase 2, 282 and as many as 45% fail even after entering the final phase of
testing.2 83
Much of the litigation around expanded access involves patients suffering
from cancer. However, cancer presents unique therapeutic challenges, and
approval rates for oncology drugs are even lower than the average; only 5% of
oncology drugs ultimately receive approval.2 84 Oncology drugs are also unique

275. See, e.g., Farquhar et al., supra note 274, at 332 (reporting that there were sixty-five
deaths attributed to treatment toxicity among women who received the high dose chemotherapy
treatment and only four such deaths among the women in control groups).
276. Shira Bender, Lauren Flicker & Rosamond Rhodes, Access for the Terminally Ill to
Experimental MedicalInnovations: A Three-ProngedTest, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 4 (2007).
277. Robert Kinders et al., Phase 0 Clinical Trials in CancerDrug Development: From FDA
Guidance to Clinical Practice, 7 MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 325, 326 (2007) ("[L]ess than ten
percent of Investigational New Drug (IND) applications for novel molecules [move] beyond the
earliest stage of development.").
278. Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the PharmaceuticalIndustry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 711, 711 (2004).
279. Kinders et al., supra note 277, at 263.
280. Kola & Landis, supra note 278, at 712 (noting that together, efficacy and safety problems
accounted for approximately 60% of all failures).
281. Id. at 712-13.
282. Id. at 712.
283. Id.
284. Kinders et al., supra note 277, at 326 ("[C]urrent approval rates for new oncology drugs
are estimated to be no more than 5% .... "); Kola & Landis, supra note 278, at 712; see also Eric
K. Rowinsky, Curtailing the High Rate of Late-Stage Attrition of Investigational Therapeutics
Against Unprecedented Targets in Patients with Lung and Other Malignancies, 10 CLINICAL
CANCER RES. 4220s, 422 Is (2004) ("Even with more than 500 oncology therapeutics in active
development, only a small fraction are achieving regulatory approval each year .... ").
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because they are more likely than other classes of drugs to fail late in the testing
process. 2 85 Of all oncology drugs that seem promising after completing Phase 1
trials, only about one third eventually obtain approval. 86 Thus, Abigail
Alliance's proposal to allow access after Phase 1 trials would be especially
problematic with regard to oncology drugs.
Even before controversy arose over allowing access to unapproved therapy,
there was a longstanding debate in the literature about the ethics of including
patients in Phase 1 trials. Many have argued that given the low prospects for
benefit, most patients' expectations are unreasonable and it may not be ethical to
allow them to enroll in research. 87 Several studies have shown that patients in
Phase I oncology trials are very unlikely to benefit from the study treatmentless than 6% show some response to the study treatment.2 88 One comprehensive
study involving 460 Phase 1 oncology trials conducted over a period of nine
years found that only 11% of research participants had a complete or partial
response to experimental treatment, and most participants had no response to
experimental treatment. 289 Although clinical trials offer some chance of benefit,
most people have no measurable response from receiving experimental therapy
even within trials.
In addition to providing only uncertain benefits, clinical trials also carry
significant risks. Approximately 38% of oncological research subjects experience

285. See, e.g., Bruce Booth, Robert Glassman & Philip Ma, Oncology's Trials, 2 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 609, 609 (2003) (noting that oncology drugs "have higher average success
rates than other therapeutic areas in early-stage trials (that is, Phase I and Phase II), [but] . . . a
lower average success rate than other therapeutic areas at Phase III"). Oncology drugs that survive
Phase 1 testing go on to fail at Phase 2 in very high rates-70% of all oncology treatments that
enter Phase 2 fail at this stage. Of the oncology treatments that go on to Phase 3 trials, 59% fail at
the final stage of testing. Kola & Landis, supranote 278, at 712.
286. Benjamin J. Falit & Cary P. Gross, Access to Experimental Drugs for Terminally Ill
Patients, 300 JAMA 2793, 2793 (2008) (citing Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski,
Economics of New Oncology DrugDevelopment, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 209 (2007)).

287. See A. Italiano et al., Treatment Outcome and Survival in Participantsof Phase I
Oncology Trials CarriedOutfrom 2003 to 2006 at Institut Gustave Roussy, 19 ANNALS ONCOLOGY
787, 787 (2007) (noting that "many authors have expressed ethical concerns about phase 1 cancer
research").
288. See id.
289. Elizabeth Horstmann et al., Risks and Benefits of Phase I Oncology Trials, 1991 Through
2002, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 895, 898-99 (2005). A partial response is defined as "an overall 50
percent reduction in the tumor, measured as the sum of the products of the two longest diameters
... or as an overall 30 percent reduction in tumor size, measured as the sum of the longest
diameters." Id. at 897.
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toxic events, 2 90 and about 14% experience the most serious category of toxic
events.29 1 Approximately one out of every two hundred research subjects in
oncology trials dies from treatment-related side effects. 292 Risks such as these are
not rendered trivial for patients seeking access to experimental therapy because
they have few options left. People who are terminally ill may suffer more or even
die sooner if they are exposed to drugs with significant and uncertain risks, 293 and
these are important reasons to limit access to experimental therapy.
B. Wider Access Proposals Will Not Solve Existing Problems and Are Too Costly
for Society To Adopt
The existing proposals for increasing access to experimental therapy are
likely to cause more problems than they solve. When powerful groups are formed
to represent sympathetic interests, there is always the potential that the response
will be out of proportion to the size of the problem and the risk that the new
policy will devolve into a policy of exceptions.294 Existing proposals for
expanded access are problematic for several reasons: 1) the great difficulty in
limiting the scope of expanded access programs; 2) the failure of existing
proposals to adequately address drug companies' incentives; 3) the fact that
addressing sponsors' concerns about liability comes at too great a cost to
patients; 4) the danger of slowing the approval process; 5) the risks of creating of
potentially dangerous markets in unapproved therapies; and 6) the negative
consequences of finding ways to fund expanded access programs.
First, there is a danger that a policy of providing access cannot be effectively
limited simply by referring to "terminally ill patients" or patients with "serious"
diseases. Although a common legal definition of a terminally ill patient is
someone who has six months to live, this is very difficult to predict.295 It may

290. Italiano et al., supra note 287, at 791.
291. Horstmann et al., supra note 289, at 899.

292. Horstmann et al., supra note 289, at 899 (finding a treatment-related mortality rate of
0.49%); Italiano et al., supra note 287, at 787 (finding a potentially treatment-related mortality rate
of approximately 0.5%); Thomas G. Roberts et al., Trends in the Risks and Benefits to Patients with
Cancer Participating in Phase I Clinical Trials, 292 JAMA 2130, 2136 (2004) (finding a
treatment-related mortality rate of 0.54%).
293. See Arthur Caplan, Is It Sound Public Policy To Let the Terminally Ill Access
Experimental Medical Innovations?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 1, 2.
294. See, e.g., Mello & Brennan, supra note 274, at 106 (observing that "[a] powerful breast
cancer lobby succeeded in persuading or, in some states, forcing insurers to provide coverage for
HDC-ABMT at a time when research into the treatment's effectiveness was still in its early
stages").
295. See Caplan, supra note 293, at 2 (citing federal statute governing access to Social

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

X:1 (2010)

also be difficult to justify distinguishing patients suffering from very debilitating
but chronic diseases from those with terminal illnesses.296
Second, drug companies, not the FDA, are often the bottleneck for access to
unapproved drugs,2 97 and addressing drug companies' incentives and interests
adequately is far too costly. The FDA does not have the authority to require that
drug companies provide expanded access.298 Drug companies may be reluctant to
provide expanded access for a variety of reasons, including concerns that
expanded access will place the company at increased risk for litigation from
patients taking unapproved drugs, delay or prevent drug approval because of
adverse events, and fail to offer enough financial incentive to merit the
investment. 299 A drug company can always choose to spend more on marketing
approved drugs and is more likely to be able to obtain profits from these efforts,
rather than just recovering costs. Of course, there may be public relations benefits
from running an expanded access program, but these benefits would have to be
significant to offset the costs of providing access to unapproved therapy.
Third, proposals to address sponsors' concerns about liability may endanger
patients. The problem for sponsors is that even if most patients' lawsuits are not
ultimately successful, they still cause drug companies to incur the financial costs
of legal representation and, possibly, to endure negative publicity.30 0

Security benefits for children, hospice care reimbursement by Medicare, and the right to use
assisted suicide in the state of Oregon under the Death with Dignity Act).
296. See id.
297. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 167, at 411 ("[T]he major bottleneck in the compassionateuse program has never been the FDA. The manufacturers have no incentives to make their
investigational products available outside clinical trials."); Menikoff, supra note 195, at 1060
("[T]he FDA appears to almost uniformly approve requests for compassionate-use access to a drug
). See .....
also Part II, supra, in which we discuss several cases where drug companies have
declined to provide access to patients who would otherwise qualify under FDA regulations.
298. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006) (providing no authority for FDA to require sponsors to
provide expanded access); 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008) (allowing but not requring that sponsors
provide expanded access to eligible patients); see also Marcee, supra note 215, at 453 (noting that
Congress and FDA allow sponsors to choose whether to provide expanded access).
299. See Peter M. Currie, Restricting Access to Unapproved Drugs: A Compelling
Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 319 (2006) (acknowledging validity of these
concerns but questioning whether "these fears justify government action to restrict access to Phase I
experimental drugs"); Richard A. Epstein, supra note 249, at 577-80; Marcee, supra note 215, at
450-55; Menikoff, supra note 195, at 1060-64; Talbott, supra note 248, at 318; Vale, supra note
200, at 2157-74.
300. See Joanna R. Cerino, Comment, The Statutory Limits of Compassion: Can Treatment
INDs Provide Meaningful Access to InvestigationalDrugsfor the Terminally Ill?, 27 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 79, 94 (2008).
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Consequently, one commentator has recommended that FDA regulations contain
a waiver provision that prohibits expanded access patients from "later suing for
adverse and even deadly effects."'3° If sponsors were certain that patients who
received unapproved drugs would not hold them liable for negative outcomes,
sponsors might be more willing to provide wider expanded access. 302 Some
advocates for FDA's final rule also have explicitly recommended waiving
liability against physicians.30 3
Although a blanket waiver of liability for injuries related to expanded access
would eliminate the uncertainty regarding liability resulting from providing
access, it raises significant concerns. Pharmaceutical companies should not be
able to obtain waivers for grossly negligent or intentional actions for several
reasons.30 4 If patients are unable to hold drug companies liable for their products,
drug companies may not use sufficient caution when deciding whether to provide
patients risky products. 30 5 Also, because sponsors conduct a great deal of
preliminary research (including research that is never published), they may be in
the best position to evaluate the limited data that is available about drugs at this
stage and therefore in the best position to decide when to conduct clinical trials
that will expose people to those risks.306 Those in charge of research and

manufacturing should be held responsible if they test experimental therapies
without sufficient data or in excessively risky circumstances. Finally, in an
environment in which many individuals do not have health insurance,30 7
providing sponsors with immunity from lawsuits arising from expanded access
injuries may leave uninsured individuals who are injured with no access to the

301. See id
302. See id.
303. Talbott, supra note 248, at 317-18 (identifying physician liability as a problem, but not
recommending liability waivers).
304. See Heverly, supra note 258, at 847 (proposing that any waivers of liability for early
access to pharmaceuticals should allow patients to retain their right to hold sponsors liable for
grossly negligent or malicious acts). Patient waivers of liability would not preclude FDA from
holding sponsors liable for failing to meet regulatory requirements, such as sponsors' obligation to
report adverse events to FDA.
305. See Bender et al., supra note 276, at 5.
306. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Because
drug manufacturers often delay or suppress negative results from clinical trials they or their
affiliated research institutions conduct, doctors, formulary committees, and policy makers [may
base] their decisions on an unrepresentative fraction of the available scientific evidence.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
307.
See
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Health
Insurance
Coverage:
2008,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin08/hlth08asc.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2009)
(reporting that approximately 15% of the U.S. population does not have health insurance).
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health care they need.3 °8 Thus, waiving sponsor or physician liability in any
significant way may put some patients in a very difficult position.
Fourth, expanded access has the potential to slow the approval process.
Expanded access may reduce clinical trial enrollment, which in turn will slow the
completion of the clinical trials needed for approval.30 9 If potential subjects had
the choice to either enroll in a clinical trial with a placebo control and a 50%
chance of obtaining treatment or enter an expanded access program knowing that
they would receive access to the unapproved therapy, few would choose to enroll
in clinical trials. Patients may have an incentive to try to manipulate the system
and render themselves ineligible for clinical trials in order to obtain treatment
through an expanded access program.31 ° In addition, sponsors also have
legitimate concerns that expanded access programs will result in more adverse
events, which could in turn delay or even prevent approval. 311 Finally, expanded
programs will result in a larger amount of data for the FDA to review, potentially
slowing the approval process.31 2 Delays to the approval process for drugs
eventually found to be safe and effective not only affect sponsors' bottom lines,
but, more importantly, will negatively affect the public health. 313
According to commentators, sponsors' fears about delays to the approval
process are exacerbated by the lack of clarity in the regulations. 3 14 One
commentator has recommended that the FDA promulgate specific regulations as
to the extent a patient receiving therapy through an expanded access program will
affect "the FDA's determination of the drug's safety and effectiveness in the
decision to grant or deny marketing approval." 31 5 In its 2009 final rule, the FDA
did not provide specific regulations regarding the analysis of data from the
expanded access patients. 3 16 However, the FDA made clear that it anticipates

308. Cf John D. Winter, Is It Time To Abandon FDA 's No Releasefrom Liability Regulation
for Clinical Studies?, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 530 (2008) (describing compensation funds, such
as the vaccine injury compensation fund, that require injured individuals to waive liability in order
to be compensated for their injuries). Of course, if U.S. citizens were universally covered for their
health care, an injury compensation fund would not be needed to justly institute waivers of liability.
309. See Cerino, supra note 300, at 94, Menikoff, supra note 195, at 1062-64.
310. Tuma, supra note 4, at 22.
311. See id.at23.
312. See id.(noting that expanded access programs will create more data regarding adverse
events for FDA to review).
313. Cf Bender et al., supra note 276, at 4 (noting that large expanded access programs may
delay clinical trial results that ultimately show the drug is ineffective).
314. See Cerino, supra note 300, at 94.
315. Id.
316. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900,
40,905 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 316).
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expanded access data will be more useful for safety assessments than for efficacy
assessments because without a control group, it is difficult to derive efficacy
information from expanded access data.3 17 Moreover, the FDA stated that it was
unaware of any case in which adverse event data from expanded access programs
caused a drug to be denied approval, 318 suggesting that sponsors' fears that
expanded access data will prevent approval of their drugs may not be justified.
Although the FDA has offered limited clarification regarding how it will evaluate
expanded access data,319 it is hard to imagine a new process for reviewing
additional data that would not cause significant delays relative to current
approval times.
Fifth, creating financial incentives for manufacturers to make unapproved
therapies widely available could lead to markets in selling unapproved therapies.
The costs of drug development and clinical trials are significant, and many drugs
do not make it to final approval.3 20 Were the FDA to allow much wider access to
unapproved drugs, and if pharmaceutical companies could make profits at earlier
stages in the development process, companies would face perverse market
incentives. Pharmaceutical companies could devise alternative and potentially
lucrative business models selling unapproved drugs to terminally ill patients with
few, if any, alternatives. 321 The prospect of a market with such a high potential
for exploitation of the sickest and most vulnerable patients is troubling.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, proposals to incentivize drug
companies to provide expanded access in various ways are very problematic.
Scholars have argued that drug companies' unwillingness to provide expanded
access is partially caused by the costs associated with providing expanded
access. 322 One commentator has advocated that sponsors be required to provide

317. See id.
318. See id
319. See id
320. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003)
(finding that the total cost of pre-approval research and development of a new drug was $802
million in 2000 dollars); Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297, 303 fig.7
(2001) (finding that only 24% of drugs that enter Phase 1 trials are eventually approved).
321. See, e.g., Judith Randal, InvestigationalDrug Access Taken to Task in Lawsuit Against
FDA, 95 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1818, 1820 (2003) ("You only have to look to the world of
unproven nutritional products and dietary supplements . . . to realize that Tier 1 approvals would
give pharmaceutical firms less incentive to invest in research and a lot of incentive to engage in
misleading advertising and promotion." (quoting Bob Erwin, President, Marti Nelson Cancer
Found.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

322. See Cerino, supra note 300, at 94-95; Marcee, supra note 215, at 452-53; Tuma, supra
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expanded access as part of the drug approval process, so that sponsors cannot
choose to restrict expanded access because of Cost.3 23 However, this solution
raises concerns about government intrusion on corporate autonomy. 33224 There may
be cases in which it is highly inefficient for sponsors to provide access at an early
stage or where a sponsor feels that safety concerns suggest that early access
would be particularly risky. A blanket requirement that all sponsors provide
expanded access as a condition of obtaining drug approval seems ill-considered.
Other scholars have proposed various mechanisms to fund expanded access
programs as a means of incentivizing sponsors. However, successfully
decreasing sponsors' expanded access costs while also appropriately using
limited health care resources is a particularly difficult problem for the expanded
access system. Proposed solutions include: 1) providing incentives to sponsors in
the form of delayed profits that are only released upon FDA approval,32 5 2)
offering drug companies extended market exclusivity for a drug that is eventually
approved by the FDA,326 3) creating a private foundation to subsidize the costs of
unapproved drugs, 327 or 4) requiring health insurance companies to pay for
unapproved drugs obtained through expanded access.328 The most complex
proposal is to allow sponsors to charge expanded access patients full market
price, as long as they place the proceeds in excess of direct costs in an interestbearing escrow account until the drug is approved.3 29 If a drug is ultimately
approved, the sponsor would gain access to the profits in the account. 330 If a drug

note 4, at 19, 22; Vale, supra note 200, at 2165. But see Menikoff, supra note 195, at 1060-62
(arguing that fears about interference with clinical trials and FDA approval, not cost concerns,
motivate drug companies' reluctance to provide expanded access).
323. See Marcee, supra note 215, at 452-53; cf Nicole E. Lombard, Note, Paternalism vs.
Autonomy: Steps Toward Resolving the Conflict Over Experimental DrugAccess Between the Food
and Drug Administration and the Terminally Ill, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 163, 185 (2007)
(advocating "active involvement" of the FDA in pressuring drug companies to provide expanded
access, but not explicitly advocating that the FDA require companies to provide expanded access).
324. Cf Salbu, supra note 249, at 429-30 (discussing the potential negative effects of
government mandated expanded access to HIV drugs).
325. See Falit & Gross, supra note 286, at 2794-95; Vale, supra note 200, at 2165-7 1.
326. See Vale, supra note 200, at 2165-71.
327. Cerino, supra note 300, at 94-95 (citing Frank Burroughs, co-founder of Abigail
Alliance).
328. Cf Sharona Hoffman, A Proposalfor FederalLegislation To Address Health Insurance
Coveragefor Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REv. 203, 206-07 (1999)
(proposing that insurance companies be required to pay for treatments provided through Phase III
trials).
329. See Falit & Gross, supra note 286, at 2794.
330. See id.
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is ultimately not approved, the profits from sales of 33that
drug would be
1
transferred to the federal government for health-related use.
However, many of these proposals to decrease sponsor's expanded access
costs may not be adequate to incentivize sponsors to provide access. Even if
sponsors sell unapproved drugs at a profit, they would likely not gain a net profit
large enough to make providing expanded access attractive.332 It is not clear that
there are a large number of patients who would be financially able to purchase
unapproved drugs.333 And even if a relatively large expanded access market did
exist, drug companies might not be able to meet demand. 334 Early in the drug
development process, sponsors have limited production capacity because
sponsors are reluctant to scale up production of a drug until Phase 3 trials, when
the drug is more likely to be approved.335 In addition, drug companies would
likely not charge "full price" for expanded access drugs because of fears that the
public would react negatively to high prices for unapproved drugs with uncertain
risks and benefits, especially in the case of terminally ill patients in highly
sympathetic situations.33 6 Finally, since the likelihood of any given drug being
approved is low, the escrow account and market exclusivity proposals may not
provide drug companies with a significant incentive to provide expanded access
early in clinical trials.337
In addition to concerns about sponsors' costs, commentators have raised
concerns about patients' ability to pay for expanded access.33 8 Even if drug
companies only recover the direct costs of expanded access drugs, drugs may still
be too costly for some patients. Furthermore, limiting access to those who can
afford to pay for it raises serious concerns about equity. Consequently, some

331. See id
332. See Currie, supra note 299, at 321-23; Okie, supra note 14, at 440.
333. See Cerino, supra note 300, at 92, 94-95; Menikoff, supra note 195, at 1065-66; Okie,
supra note 14, at 440.
334. See Currie, supra note 299, at 322; Okie, supra note 14, at 440.
335. See Currie, supra note 299, at 322; see also Kola & Landis, supra note 278, at 711-12
(finding that approximately 11% of drugs that enter Phase 1 trials, 38% of drugs that enter Phase 2
trials, and 55% of drugs that enter Phase 3 trials are eventually approved).
336. Okie, supra note 14, at 440 (quoting a representative of Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America as saying that drug companies "certainly couldn't charge full price" for
post-Phase I drugs); cf KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION SPOTLIGHT, VIEWS ON
PRESCRIPTION

DRUGS

AND

THE

PHARMACEUTICAL

INDUSTRY

8

(2008),

http://www.kff.org/spotlight/rxdrugs/upload/rx-drugs.pdf (finding that 74% of the U.S. public
believes that the pharmaceutical industry makes "too much profit").
337. See DiMasi, supra note 320 (reporting that 20% of drugs that enter Phase 1 clinical trials
are eventually approved); Kola & Landis, supra note 278, at 711.
338. See Cerino, supra note 300, at 94-95; Hoffman, supra note 328, at 206-07.
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commentators have argued that health insurance should pay for expanded access
when a patient has no other treatment option.3 39
This proposed solution would generate quite a few problems. In a context of
limited health care resources, paying for potentially unsafe and ineffective drugs
may not be the most appropriate use of the resources. 340 For example, in Britain,
the National Health Service does not cover some drugs that are approved, but
also are expensive and provide relatively short extensions of lifespan, because
purchasing such drugs is not the most effective use Britain's limited health care
resources. 341 Creating a private foundation to subsidize patients' purchase of
unapproved drugs similarly raises questions about how to wisely use finite
resources, and, moreover, seems unlikely to occur.342 Awarding market
exclusivity extensions to sponsors who provide expanded access would
exacerbate concerns about health care costs and resource allocation. Although
drug companies would provide unapproved drugs to expanded access patients
free of charge under the market exclusivity proposal, sponsors might be able to
pass on the costs of expanded access programs to future patients in the form of
higher drug prices.34 3
Devising a system that could increase health care costs for uncertain benefit
seems unwise. The price of drugs already contributes significantly to increases in
health care costs. 34 4 The United States has the most expensive health care system
345
in the world and spends more per person on health care than any other country.
Spending on health care has increased above the rate of inflation for a number of
years.346 High costs have led to decreased access to health care for many,347 and
studies have shown that lack of insurance may result in as many as 18,000

339. See Hoffman, supra note 328, at 206-207.
340. See Falit & Gross, supra note 286, at 2795.
341. See Gardiner Harris, British Balance Benefit vs. Cost of Latest Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2008, at Al.
342. But see Cerino, supra note 300, at 94-95 (arguing that a private foundation should be
created).
343. See Vale, supra note 200, at 2165-7 1.
344. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, High and Rising Health Care Costs. Part 2:
Technological Innovation, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 932, 932 (2005) (noting that technological
innovations, including pharmaceutical innovation, contribute to rising health care costs); Zijun
Wang, The Convergence of Health Care Expenditure in the US States, 18 HEALTH ECON. 55, 69
(2008) (finding that the cost of prescription drugs was one of the most significant factors in
explaining divergence in health care costs in state programs).
345. See Bodenheimer, supra note 344, at 932.
346. Id.
347. Ezekiel Emanuel, The Cost-Coverage Tradeoff: "It's Health Care Costs, Stupid," 299
JAMA 947, 947 (2008).
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increased deaths a year.348 Rising health care expenditures also have significant
economic consequences more generally, because they make it difficult for
American firms to remain competitive in a global marketplace. 349 These
problems have led to significant, if unpredictable, movement in the direction of
health care reform. 350 If health care reform efforts are to succeed, there is little, if
any, room for adding to our enormous health care expenditures. 351 The drive for
reform may therefore have created an inhospitable climate for expanding access
to unproven therapy in a way that increases health care costs.
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: CHANGING CLINICAL TRIALS
The Abigail Alliance case and other claims for access involve terminally ill
people who were unable to obtain access to clinical trials. One solution might be
to change the approach to clinical trials more dramatically, perhaps by expanding
the inclusion criteria for later phase (Phase 2b and 3) trials.352 Scientists have
argued that Phase 2 studies would be more useful if they studied a larger sample
size 353 and had less restrictive inclusion and exclusion criteria to broaden the pool
of patients eligible to participate.354 Making the inclusion criteria less restrictive
for Phase 2 and 3 trials and increasing the number of patients enrolled in those
phases might both produce valuable scientific knowledge and prevent expanded
access programs from interfering with clinical investigation.355 It would also
ensure that individuals being exposed to unapproved drugs were provided the
careful safety monitoring involved in clinical trials. Moreover, increasing the size

348. INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH - PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8
(2004).
349. Ron Wyden & Bob Bennett, Finally, Fixing Health Care: What's Different Now?, 27
HEALTH AFF. 689, 690 (2008).
350. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Missing in Health Bills: Solutions for Rising Costs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2009, at Al (describing Congressional health care reform legislation).
351. Id. (noting that "[t]here are a variety of ideas for attacking costs more aggressively," and
Senators and administrative officials are focusing on containing costs, but there are important
barriers to cost-cutting); see also Transcript:Obama's Health CareAddress, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
2009, http://specials.washingtonpost.com/annotations/obama-health-care-address (last visited Nov.
Put
17, 2009) ("[O]ur health care system is placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers ....
simply, our health care problem is our deficit problem.").
352. See Marcee, supra note 215, at 456 (recommending increasing the size of Phase 2 trials).
353. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL TRIALS 5 (1996); see Melissa
Fazzari et al., The Phase II/Ili Transition: Toward the Proofof Efficacy in Cancer Clinical Trials,
21 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 360, 361 (2000).
354. See Fazzari et al., supra note 353, at 363.
355. See Marcee, supra note 215, at 455-57.
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of Phase 2 trials might not increase drug companies' overall costs because better
data earlier in the process might prevent companies from conducting some costly,
but ultimately unsuccessful, Phase 3 trials. 356 Our analysis has demonstrated that
it is the research sponsors, not the FDA or the courts, who are the real bottleneck
preventing individuals from receiving access to unapproved therapy. Yet, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to create sound incentives for sponsors to provide
access to unapproved therapy without raising concerns about the exploitation of
desperate individuals who have limited treatment options. Requiring sponsors to
include more individuals in clinical trials might save sponsors money while
providing much-needed data on unapproved therapy, and thus may be much more
effective than the proposals that have been made to date.
Of course, enrolling more subjects in clinical trials may not adequately
address the concerns of individuals suffering from rare conditions or for whom
off-label indications are the last resort.357 There may also be other important
exceptions, including trials for which there are important scientific reasons not to
enroll patients with complex conditions. Therefore, we do not propose that the
FDA's regulations for expanded access to unapproved therapy be abandoned, but
that the provisions in these regulations be interpreted in a careful and restrictive
fashion.
Many clinical trials do not have sufficient numbers of subjects enrolled,35 8
and so it seems unwise to further decrease the incentives for patients to
participate in clinical trials. Additionally, although tens of thousands of patients
have been enrolled in expanded access programs, the data collected from these
programs have been incomplete, with information about less than half of the
patients involved being sent back to the FDA. 359 The information that has been
returned to the FDA has not been very useful.36 ° Unless expanded access
programs can be better designed to produce data of some value (which is a
proposal we would also support), they cannot substitute for clinical trials on
people with complex conditions.

356. See Fazzari et al., supra note 353, at 367.
357. See Section III.C, supra; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34,
312.36 (2008); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147,
75,167 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 CFR § 312). Significantly, individuals
seeking to enroll in trials for the off-label use of a drug may have fewer options than if the sponsor
was seeking to approve the drug for use in their disease.
358. Gina Kolata, Lack of Study Volunteers Is Said To Hobble Fight Against Cancer, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at Al.
359. Ann T. Farrell, Food & Drug Admin., Address at Accelerating Anticancer Agent
Development Workshop: FDA: Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Oncology Expanded
Access (June 18, 2009).
360. Id.
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Significantly, the idea of transforming clinical trials in this manner is not
without precedent. Some have argued that "[t]he current clinical research
enterprise in the United States is not consistently producing an adequate supply
of information to meet the needs of clinical and health policy decision
makers.",36' In 1993, Sir Richard Peto and colleagues advocated for "large, simple
trials," involving less complex protocols, enrollment of large numbers of research
subjects, limited exclusion criteria, and only a few measures on which data would
be collected, for this very reason. 362
In particular, clinical trials with strict exclusion criteria make it impossible to
obtain systematic data on subpopulations of patients with complex conditions
before a drug is released for use by the population at large.363 Researchers have
advocated for clinical trials that "include a more diverse study population ... to
enroll patients in the trial with characteristics that reflect the range and
distribution of patients observed in clinical practice., 364 Unlike smaller studies
with relatively homogenous groups of people, larger, more diverse clinical trials
can provide enough information to examine the effects of interventions on
subgroups based on race, age, gender, and stage of disease.36 5 More information
about a drug prior to widely marketing that drug is clearly preferable for public
health reasons.36 6
Sponsors may be concerned that moving in the direction of large, simple
trials may produce more information about the risks of a drug before the approval
process is completed.367 Including sicker patients in clinical trials may increase

361. Sean R. Tunis et al., PracticalClinical Trials: Increasing the Value of ClinicalResearch
for Decision Making in Clinicaland HealthPolicy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003).
362. Richard Peto et al., Large-Scale Randomized Evidence: Large, Simple Trials and
Overviews of Trials, 703 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 314 (1993); accord John S. March et al., The
Casefor PracticalTrials in Psychiatry, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 836, 842 (2005); Tunis, supra note

361, at 1630.
363. Martin Fortin et al., Randomized Controlled Trials: Do They Have External Validity for
Patientswith Multiple Comorbidities?,4 ANNALS OF FAMILY MED. 104, 104-05 (2006) ("To ensure

the internal validity of their findings, many [Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs)] exclude
patients with multiple comorbid conditions. In other cases, comorbidities of patients actually
enrolled in the RCTs are not reported. These trials, however, provide the data that inform the
justification for use of new treatments and interventions for all patients. Excluding a subset of the
population from such trials or from the final reports means important information about the proper
use of a treatment or intervention for that subset is not available.").
364. Tunis, supra note 361, at 1626.
365. March, supra note 362, at 838.
366. See Vale, supra note 200, at 2172.
367. Cf Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial: Should Dying Patients Have Access to
Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 40 (quoting the director of the Office of
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the number of adverse events in the trial, making it more difficult to demonstrate
a treatment effect. 368 In other words, if people are so sick that the disease causes
them to experience morbidity or mortality, it may be more difficult to separate
which negative outcomes should be attributed to their disease and which should
be attributed to the unapproved drug. One way to address these concerns is to
stratify the sample into two groups: those research subjects who would
traditionally fit under rigid inclusion/exclusion criteria and those who would not.
The primary analysis of the data would focus on subjects who would meet
traditional inclusion criteria, and secondary analyses could include information
from sicker or more fragile research subjects. It is true that including sicker
patients may still make it more time-consuming and difficult to interpret the data.
However, as we have discussed, the current approach has been forcefully
criticized for offering inadequate information for policymakers, physicians, and
patients by excluding sicker patients or more representative members of the
population.3 69
While these expansions probably would slow down the approval process, it
is not clear that sponsors' concerns about delays to or denials of approval
represent the most important concerns. Many commentators have argued that the
FDA approval process is too lenient. 370 The post-approval revelation that
Vioxx 371 increased patients' risk of heart attacks by a factor of five provides a
prominent example of an instance in which the FDA approval process was not
adequately stringent.3 72 If the FDA approval process is slowed in order to obtain

Oncology Drug Products as saying that many companies fear "the FDA will find some toxicity in
the expanded-access program ...

and the drug will be killed").

368. See, e.g., Fortin, supra note 363, at 107 (noting that "depression in patients with
hypertension can result in a difficult clinical course because depression may adversely affect the
patients' adherence to medication and self-care regimens"); Yves Lacourci~re, A Multicenter,
Randomized, Double-Blind Study of the Antihypertensive Efficacy and Tolerability of lrbesartanin
PatientsAged > 65 Years with Mild to Moderate Hypertension, 22 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1213,

1213 (2000) (examining the effectiveness of a drug to lower blood pressure excluding conditions
that may lead to adverse outcomes such as high blood pressure, previous cardiac disease, and
stroke, "as well as other preexisting or present severe medical or psychologic conditions").
369. See Fortin, supra note 363, at 108 ("Research devoted to generating knowledge to be
applied in medical practice should take into consideration the complex reality of the situation.");
March, supra note 362, at 838; Peto, supra note 362, at 378; Tunis, supra note 361, at 1625.
370. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 37 (2007).
371. Vioxx was a painkiller that was intended to provide pain relief without causing the
stomach problems associated with other common painkillers such as aspirin. See, e.g., Marc
Kaufman, Merck FoundLiable in Vioxx Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at AI.
372. See, e.g., Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing
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much-needed data, this is an important cost to factor into our decisionmaking, but
some reasonable amount of delay may be a wise cost for the public to incur.
Finally, it is also important to note that these same arguments could have
been raised against including children in research 373 and are currently being made
regarding the inclusion of pregnant women.37 4 The Pediatric Rule and the Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act were passed in recognition of the fact that
many drugs had not been tested in children at all before they were put into use.375
Many have rightly realized that when vulnerable populations are protected
through exclusion from research, or when data is protected by excluding
vulnerable populations, the result is ad-hoc experimentation on patients by their
doctors.3 76 In this case, these protections also result in a denial of access to

(PhaseIV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 365 (2006).

373. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Glass & Ariella Binik, Rethinking Risk in PediatricResearch, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 567, 567-68 (2008) (discussing the history of pediatric research regulations);
L.L. Mathis & S. Iyasu, Safety Monitoring of Drugs Granted Exclusivity Under the Best
Pharmaceuticalsfor Children Act: What the FDA Has Learned, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 133, 133 (2007) ("Because of features unique to the pediatric population and

medication usage in this population, it may be difficult to identify adverse drug-related safety
events in children.").
374. Janice K. Bush, The Industry Perspective on the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Trials,
69 ACAD. MED. 708, 710 (1994) (explaining that birth defects occur naturally, and spontaneous
abortion occurs in 20-30% of pregnancies, so the "dilemma is how to separate which defects might
be due to drugs versus those that are just occurring naturally"); R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to
Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 135, 141, 144 (1993)
(noting that some have argued that "[i]nclusion of women equals 'noise' in the data," and have
raised concerns about liability as a result of harm to fetuses).
375. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, 42 U.S.C. § 284m (2006); Regulations Requiring
Manufacturers To Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological Products in
Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,631 (Dec. 2, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 312,
314, 601) (noting that the absence of pediatric testing and labeling may put pediatric patients at risk
of adverse events or expose pediatric patients to ineffective treatments).
376. Glass & Binik, supra note 373, at 574 ("We strongly support an increase in pediatric
research to provide the pediatric population with effective medical care, and finally to eradicate the
'therapeutic orphan."'); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Drugs, Guidelines for the Ethical
Conduct of Studies To Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric Populations,95 PEDIATRICS 286, 294 (1995)
("The AAP believes it is unethical to deny children appropriate access to existing and new
therapeutic agents.") (guidelines were reaffirmed in September 2005); Nat'l Insts. of Health, NIH
Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as Participants in Research Involving Human
Subjects, Mar. 6, 1998, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not98-024.html
("After
reviewing reports, background papers, and a study of a sample of NIH-sponsored clinical research
abstracts that suggested that 10-20% inappropriately excluded children, the conveners concluded
that there is a need to enhance the inclusion of children in clinical research. This conclusion is

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

X:I (2010)

clinical trials that could be a valuable option for people with one last hope for
treatment.
One of the difficulties that our proposal cannot address adequately is that
enrolling more individuals in clinical trials means that these individuals may
receive placebo instead of the unapproved treatment. Our proposal does not give
individuals a guarantee of receiving access to unapproved therapy. Still, the
chance of a placebo is an improvement compared to any proposal which does not
adequately address the most important barrier to access: the lack of incentives for
drug companies to provide treatment. We have attempted to address this problem
directly. Additionally, in many cases, there are significant risks posed by
unapproved therapy. Because experimental therapies by definition have not been
proven to be effective, placebo-controlled trials are both scientifically important
377
and morally acceptable.
It is true that the terminally ill who are seeking a chance at a cure or an
extension of life have very sympathetic claims that we cannot ignore. However,
there are other situations in which the law privileges societal needs over the
sympathetic claims of individuals in difficult situations.378 For instance,
witnesses may have good reason to fear that if they provide testimony in certain
criminal cases, the defendants they testify against may threaten their lives or the
lives of their family. 379 However, fear for one's life is not a valid defense for
contempt of court. 380 The witness protection program was created to protect
witnesses who place themselves in danger by testifying, but the witness
protection program involves considerable sacrifices and does not offer a
guarantee that a witness and her family will be kept safe. Justice Frankfurter
justified this approach by explaining that "[e]very citizen of course owes to his
society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law. 3 8 1 In
the case of People v. Carradine,the Supreme Court of Illinois explained why it

based upon scientific information, demonstrated human need, and considerations of justice for
children in receiving adequately evaluated treatments.").
377. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES
FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, Guideline 11 (2002), available at
http://www.cioms.ch/frame-guidelines nov_2002.htm ("Placebo may be used: when there is no
established effective intervention .. "); WORLD MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2008), available at
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/l0policies/b3/index.html ("The use of placebo, or no
treatment, is acceptable in studies where no current proven intervention exists ... .
378. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 158 (1987).
379.1d.
380. Id.; John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 327
(1999).
381. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
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upheld a contempt of court conviction of a woman too fearful to testify as
follows:
[O]ne of the problems that the Court has is that unless we receive the
cooperation of the citizens who see certain alleged events take place these
events are not going to be rooted out, nor are perpetrators of these acts going to
be brought before the bar of justice unless citizens stand up to be counted, and I
think this [fear] is not a valid reason for not testifying. If it's a valid reason
then we might as well close the doors.382

The court made it clear that creating an exception for witnesses to testify out of
fear for their lives would come at too high a price for the legal system to bear.
Proposals to permit access to unapproved drugs outside clinical trials come at a
similarly high price, in this case risking the integrity of our system for evaluating
the safety and efficacy of drugs.
Finally, we are in no way proposing to eliminate expanded access programs.
There are likely to be circumstances in which expanded access programs are
necessary. For instance, there may be cases where the Phase 1 data raises few
safety concerns for a particular drug, and individuals are seeking off-label use,
requesting treatment for a rare condition, or have some other need that clinical
trials simply cannot meet. Although it is still important to develop ways to collect
some limited data on the safety and efficacy of treatments in compassionate use
programs, the FDA may appropriately decide that there is an important role for
expanded access programs in these and similar instances.
CONCLUSION

The highly sympathetic nature of the claims for access to experimental
therapy by terminally or seriously ill patients makes it difficult to confront the
hard policy questions at the heart of this debate. Courts lack the institutional
competence and policymaking expertise to address these questions, questions
which are better confronted through the legislative branch. Moreover, a careful
examination of the possible solutions to the problem of sponsors' incentives to
provide access reveals that the proposed solutions are costly and unsound,
especially given the current climate of health care reform. Instead of shortsighted proposals to modify the current health care and research system, a better
approach would be to allow very limited access to unapproved drugs outside of
clinical trials while expanding eligibility for clinical trials in order to ensure that
more people receive access in a controlled and systematic fashion. Although our
proposal may not satisfy those desperately seeking their last hope for a cure, it is
382. People v. Carradine, 52 111. 2d 231, 234 (1972) (quoting the trial court's reasoning).
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time to recognize that the cost of providing broad access to unapproved therapy
is far too high to bear.

